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INTRODUCTION
Due to a scant and ambiguous historical record, the original intent
of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cannot be known.1 Yet, with
increasing frequency, commentators have declared that the original
understanding of the Takings Clause only covered “direct, physical
takings.”2 In fact, this “direct, physical takings” thesis lacks historical
support. Contrary to most recent scholarship, the text and historical
record of the Takings Clause arguably support a just compensation
requirement for regulatory takings.3 The existing evidence, however,
is sufficiently ambiguous to preclude a clear sense of the original
understanding.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.”).
2. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985)
[hereinafter Treanor, Just Compensation Clause]; see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land
Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253
(1996) (arguing against modern regulatory takings doctrine on the basis of colonial
land use regulation); Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause—“Poor Relation” No More?, 47
OKLA. L. REV. 417, 420 (1994) (finding that James Madison’s choice of words
supports the notion that the clause was only intended to cover direct and physical
takings); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995) (“While the evidence of
original intent is limited, it clearly indicates that the Takings Clause was intended to
apply only to physical takings.”) [hereinafter Treanor, Takings Clause].
3. A regulatory taking is an acquisition of property by regulation of property
rights, as when, for example, a law prohibits the right to use a parcel of land. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
101 (1985) (discussing various forms of regulatory takings and finding that the
“protean forms of regulation all amount to partial takings of private property”). As
the Supreme Court explained in United States v. General Motors, “[The Takings
Clause] may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of
rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess,
use and dispose of it.” 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). This Article addresses regulatory
takings, as such, and will not address the distinction between partial and total
regulatory takings.
This Article also considers consequential takings. For example, when a law
destroys a piece of property or a property right by consequence of the regulation of
something else, or a regulation that causes the flooding of land so that the property
owner’s property becomes useless. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 51-52 (discussing
consequential damages); Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the
Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1292 (discussing the theory that a
compensable taking would be determined based upon the proximity of the
government actor to the harm).
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The Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission4 sparked an ongoing controversy over the original
intent of the Takings Clause. The Court in Lucas held that any
regulation of land that destroyed all value of the property constituted
a taking.5 In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that James Madison
intended the Takings Clause to be limited to “direct, physical
takings.”6 Moreover, Blackmun cited early state court decisions that
precluded compensation for regulations that solely affected property
values.7 Following the Court’s concession that “Justice Blackmun is
correct that early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings
Clause embraced regulations of property at all,”8 heated debate
ensued over the proper application of the original intent in the
regulatory takings context.9
The leading twentieth-century case on regulatory takings,
Pennsylvania Coal Corp. v. Mahon,10 has come under scrutiny as well.11
In Mahon, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, declared:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits. . . . The general rule at least is, that while property may be
4. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
5. See id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”).
6. See id. at 1057 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Treanor, Just
Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 711).
7. See id. at 1058 n.24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Coates v. City of New
York, 7 Cow. 585, 605 (N.Y. 1827); Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5
Cow. 538, 542 (N.Y. 1826); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Metc. 55 (Mass. 1846);
State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858)).
8. Id. at 1028 n.15.
9. See, e.g., William J. Fisher, III, The Trouble With Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1394 (1993) (arguing that Justice Scalia “selects from a large and eclectic set of
constitutional principles those that best suit his purposes in a given case”). Professor
Fisher claims that Justice Scalia deemed the Takings Clause’s original meaning
“entirely irrelevant.” See id. In fact, Justice Scalia merely noted: “Justice
Blackmun . . . argu[es] that our description of the ‘understanding’ of land
ownership that informs the Takings Clause is not supported by early American
experience. That is largely true, but entirely irrelevant.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028
n.15. This Article shows that Justice Scalia’s view—that colonial practices were of
limited value in interpreting the original intent—is correct based on the absence of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the reliance on due process for early state
property protection.
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11. See generally William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the
Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 816-17 (1998) (discussing the
misunderstanding of the Mahon decision).
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regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
12
recognized as a taking.

Justice Holmes’ view, based on the diminution of property value,
has become enshrined in modern takings doctrine.13 There is little
evidence that his pragmatic doctrine of when a regulation “goes too
far” is historically supported.14 The novelty of Justice Holmes’
particular formulation of regulatory takings law, however, does not
mean compensation for regulatory takings was unintended by the
Framers.
It is the thesis of this Article that most scholarly commentary on the
original understanding of the Takings Clause does not address the
actual original understanding,15 but merely the wisdom of adopting
one of the various historical views on eminent domain. In particular,
the constitutional text and pre-ratification history relied upon by the
“direct, physical takings” thesis offers insufficient evidence to prove
just compensation excludes regulatory takings.16 In contrast, the postratification commentary of James Madison, author of the Takings
Clause, and the influential philosophies of William Blackstone, John
Locke, and Hugo Grotius appear to support a regulatory takings
analysis.17
The Takings Clause represented a new development when ratified,
as it limited the powers of the legislature as well as the executive.18 A
regulatory taking was unthinkable in the colonies and under most
12. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
13. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 798 (“[Mahon] has repeatedly
been described as the central case in modern takings law.”).
14. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 29 (“Historical arguments have played virtually
no role in the actual interpretation of the clause.”).
15. For purposes of this Article, “original understanding” and “original intent”
will be used interchangeably to refer to the Framers’ meaning of the constitutional
text. This Article will not use a theory that attempts to “translate” the Founders’
motivations into modern circumstances. For an explanation of the merits of
“translation,” see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1195
(1993).
16. Cf. Hart, supra note 2, at 1253 (relying on evidence of colonial land
regulation); Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 836-55 (relying on James
Madison’s post-ratification commentary).
17. See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (suggesting that
every person is entitled to use and enjoyment of his or her property except where
that use and enjoyment interferes with the law); 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET
PACIS 118-19 (William Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1853) (1625)
(suggesting that the taking of a right requires compensation); JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 119 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1967) (1690) (arguing that every person that possesses or enjoys property gives
tacit consent to the laws of the government).
18. See BERNARD SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 26 (1997) (arguing that Madison
adopted Hamilton’s language from the New York Constitution, which “removed the
power of the legislature to deprive a person of his rights,” and thus only the judiciary
may take property away).
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early state constitutions because an act of the legislature that took
property was considered to imply consent of the property owner.19
Moreover, the Takings Clause originally was inapplicable to the
states. The record of colonial just compensation practices is,
therefore, of limited value because the state governments had no
experience enforcing a just compensation clause of such sweeping
jurisdiction, and the state ratifying conventions had no reason to
expect the Takings Clause to reach their own legislatures.
From the nation’s earliest days, takings case law has been
inconsistent.
Much history surrounds property rights in the
Founding Era, but little history is directly applicable to the Takings
Clause.20 The lack of historical material on the Takings Clause has
caused the original intent analysis to hinge largely on the scholar’s
choice of emphasis.21 Although the Supreme Court’s case-by-case
handling of the Takings Clause may satisfy no one, the original
understanding cannot serve as a guide for the courts. The riddle of
regulatory takings may be resolved only through the common law
and stare decisis.22
This Article adopts the standard methodology of originalism,
interpreting the Constitution according to the following hierarchy of
factors: (1) the plain meaning of the text in light of the entire
document;
(2)
public
statements
explaining
the
text
contemporaneous with ratification; (3) private statements
contemporaneous with ratification; and (4) post-enactment history
and practice.23 An analysis of the Takings Clause through the
19. But see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 84 (finding that “the use of
land, both in rural and urban areas, was extensively regulated in the colonies”); Hart,
supra note 2, at 1253 (“[C]olonial governments regulated land use extensively for
purposes other than preventing harm.”).
20. See generally Hart, supra note 2, at 1254-81 (providing a survey of colonial land
use law).
21. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 99-100 (discussing the lack of data and
legislative history on the motivation behind the Takings Clause); Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 2, at 811-12 (explaining that scholars focus little attention on
original intent because of a lack of evidence of the Framers’ intent).
22. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 745 (1988) (arguing that the original understanding must defer
to longstanding precedent). Where there is a longstanding precedent and the
original intent is unclear, it would make sense to follow precedent. Such a rule
requires just compensation for at least some regulatory takings.
23. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552-53 (1994) (presenting this hierarchy of factors and
noting the variety of scholars that use this methodology, including Akhil Reed Amar,
Robert Bork, John Hart Ely, and Justice Antonin Scalia); see also ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990). Bork states that:
The search is not for a subjective intention. . . . [W]hat counts is what the
public understood. Law is a public act. Secret reservations or intentions
count for nothing. All that counts is how the words used in the Constitution

186

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:181

application of the originalist theory indicates that: (1) the text is
silent as to regulatory takings; (2) public and private statements
contemporaneous with ratification were essentially nonexistent; and
(3) post-enactment history is limited generally to a 1792 essay by
James Madison and early state court decisions construing state just
compensation clauses.
Scholars agree that very little historical material exists from which
to ascertain the Framers’ intent.24
The just compensation
requirement first appeared when James Madison offered his draft of
the Bill of Rights to Congress in a speech on June 8, 1789.25 This
draft appears to be the sole pre-ratification statement that directly
addressed the Takings Clause.
The lack of material has made historical analysis difficult because
there is no contemporary discussion of what the text might cover.
Professor Stoebuck pondered “how [eminent domain] got into our
constitutions at all.”26 It appears that Madison authored the Takings
Clause of his own initiative.27 This historical gap has caused scholars
to focus on Madison’s remarks, both before and after ratification.28
would have been understood at the time. The original understanding is thus
manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates at
the [ratifying] conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles,
dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.
Id.
24. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 99-100. Bosselman states that:
There is a conspicuous absence of historical data that might enable one to
determine why Madison added the just compensation language to the Fifth
Amendment. Records of state constitutional conventions and ratifying
conventions shed no light on the subject. Nor do the debates in Congress at
the time the Bill of Rights was proposed. . . . Such material as is available
discloses virtually no debate on the last clause of what is now the Fifth
Amendment.
Id.; see also Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 811 (“Scholars have generally
focused more on philosophy and economics than they have on history, partly
because of the paucity of historical evidence of the framers’ intent.”).
25. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (“No person shall . . .
be obliged to relinquish his property where it may be necessary for public use,
without just compensation.”); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 99 (“When
Madison’s draft was first offered to the House in a speech during the first session of
Congress, on June 8, 1789, it added a ‘just compensation’ requirement. . . . The
language, but not the substance changed slightly . . . to its present form.”).
26. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV.
553, 595 (1972).
27. Madison does not state what caused him to include the Clause in his draft of
the Bill of Rights, but a just compensation clause was not proposed by any of the state
ratifying conventions. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 834.
28. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1181-82 (1991) (arguing that Madison sought to get the Takings Clause ratified
without substantial support for its content by bundling it with other clauses of the
Fifth Amendment and concluding that “[o]n these two provisions [the Takings
Clause and original Fourteenth Amendment], Madison was putting forth his own
somewhat prophetic ideas, rather than distilling the zeitgeist”); Treanor, Takings
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In Part I, this Article explores the text of the Takings Clause. Part
II discusses Madison’s pre-ratification proposal of the Takings Clause
and other Founding Era commentary. Part III examines Madison’s
post-ratification comments on just compensation and early
commentary. Part IV explores colonial and early state charters and
documents covering property rights. Part V examines influential preratification philosophy on the requirement of just compensation.
Part VI describes colonial enforcement of just compensation. Finally,
Part VII discusses early post-ratification case law.
I.

THE TEXT: “NOR SHALL PROPERTY BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.”
A. The Meaning of “Taken”

The text of the Takings Clause is silent on the question of whether
regulatory takings are compensable.29 Plausible interpretations of the
term “taken” favor both sides of the argument.30
One interpretation of the term “taken” is that one can only “take”
property by an actual appropriation and not by interfering, however
severely, with property rights. Professor Bernard Schwartz supports
this argument with reference to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, which
was contemporaneous with the ratification of the Bill of Rights.31
Schwartz argues that the relevant definitions of the verb “to take” in
Johnson’s Dictionary—“‘To seize what is not given;” “To snatch; to
seize;” “To get; to have; to appropriate;” “To get; to procure;” and
“To fasten on; to seize’”—all argue for an actual acquisition of
property.32
Schwartz’s interpretation is made in the originalist tradition,
looking to the meanings of words at the time they were written.33
Clause, supra note 2, at 836 (“Madison’s conception of the Takings Clause . . . is
significant because of his prominent role in its promulgation.”); see also Treanor, Just
Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 708 (“The just compensation clause reflected the
liberalism of its author, James Madison.”).
29. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1290 (“Application of the Takings Clause to
regulations of land use must confront and explain the silence in the constitutional
text.”).
30. Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15
(1992) (“[T]he text of the clause can be read to encompass both regulatory as well as
physical deprivations . . . .”), and Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at
711 (noting that “a broader reading would not do violence to the text”), with
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420 (arguing that “taken” indicates an acquisition, not
something short of acquisition, as in a regulatory taking).
31. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420-21 (quoting 1-2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755-56)).
32. See id.
33. See BORK, supra note 23, at 144 (discussing how the originalist theory requires
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Schwartz’s reading, however, is not the only reasonable way to
understand Johnson’s definitions. Madison did not use the active
tense of “to take.” The passive tense of the verb “to take” in the
Takings Clause (“nor shall property be taken”) emphasizes the
property’s removal from its original owner, his dispossession, and not
the mode of that removal, such as a physical seizure. Dispossession
was a concern in the Founding Era. The 1776 Virginia Constitution,
from which Madison, a Virginian himself, may have partly modeled
the Takings Clause,34 stated: “all men . . . cannot be taxed or
deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent,
or that of their representatives so elected.”35 Property “taken” from
an individual could mean that an individual has been deprived of his
property. In fact, one influential colonial document declared that
property is “taken” whenever laws “affect” property without the
property owner’s consent.36
Although the verb tense is important to understand the term
“taken,” the need to read “taken” in the context of “property” is
equally important.37 One historical understanding of property
extended beyond physical objects to appurtenant rights,38 and even to
personal liberties.39 Indeed, eighteenth-century scholars recognized a
number of “incorporeal hereditaments,” which were treated as things
despite their intangible character.40
If tangible property was
analysis of how the words would have been understood at the time). “The original
understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such
as debates at the [ratifying] conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles,
dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.” Id.
34. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 99 (“In Madison’s initial draft he
followed closely the Virginia Declaration of Rights.”) (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, HOW
THE HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 19-20 (1952)).
35. VA. CONST. OF 1776, art. I, § 6, reprinted in 7 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3813 (1909).
36. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
37. See D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining “Property” in the Just Compensation
Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1853-54 (1995) (noting the importance of defining
“property” to the interpretation of the Takings Clause).
38. See Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight,
UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1235 (1996) (suggesting that takings of rights associated with real
property were compensable as stemmed from Grotius’ natural law writings, which
declared that the taking of a right required compensation) (citing 2 HUGO GROTIUS,
DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS 118-19 (William Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1853)
(1625)).
39. See Laura Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 136 (1990)
(suggesting that Madison had an understanding of property “as including rights to
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, physical liberty, and the ability to use
one’s intelligence and creative powers”).
40. See Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 333 (1991) (listing as examples easements and profits,
as well as feudal rights such as advowsons and tithes). Professor Alexander also notes
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understood to include intangible rights, such as rights of use, then
the word “taken,” even defined as “to seize,” would include regulatory
takings. Even if intangible property must be alienable to fall under
the Takings Clause, regulatory takings still would exist in certain
instances. The word “taken” does not determine the meaning of the
word “property,” but rather, “property” determines the meaning of
the word “taken.”
The easiest way to view this contextual importance to the meaning
of “taken” is to consider a form of property that cannot be seized
physically, but must be seized by regulation. To use a modern
example, suppose the Takings Clause had said, “nor shall intellectual
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”41 It is
unlikely that one would argue that the Takings Clause was a dead
letter based on a physicalist interpretation of the verb “to take.”
Instead, the question must depend upon the nature of the property
covered by the Takings Clause.
Incorporating Johnson’s definitions with a broad legal concept of
property, a regulatory taking may be understood to occur when
property is “procured” from its owner, or to mean that property has
been “seized without being given.” For example, an owner of
beachfront property who is not permitted to build anything on his
land because of government regulation could argue, with perfect
sense, that the government has “fastened on” his land. If the
property owner can claim he no longer truly owns the property
because the government regulation is directly preventing him from
using his land, it is reasonable to say that the government “seized” the
property from him.42
the increase in speculative interests, such as promissory notes and banknotes, which
could be transferred like other forms of property. See id. at 333-34.
41. Intellectual property is not a term from the Founding Era, but is used here as
an example of one understanding of property that entails a particular meaning for
the word “taken.”
42. Cf. William Michael Treanor, The Original Intent of the Takings Clause, LEGAL
TIMES, May 11, 1998, at 27. Treanor presents the analogy that:
If I tell my daughter she cannot play with her ball in the house, she has lost
something of value (to her)—the right to play with the ball in the house. I
have regulated what she can do with the ball, but I haven’t “taken” it. She is
still free to play with it outside. I can only “take” her ball when I physically
seize it.
The flaw in this argument is that our legal system, rightly, has a more nuanced
conception of property. It is possible for a legal right to be “taken,” especially if
there was a legislative grant of that right. Although the example allows the child to
play outside, if she were not allowed to play with the ball anywhere, many would say
this amounted to taking the ball away from her. See Roger Pilon, Taking Liberties with
Property Rights: Liberal Environmentalists Distort History to Promote Government Regulation,
LEGAL TIMES, May 25, 1998 (criticizing Treanor’s narrow interpretation of the
Takings Clause).
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The idea of an indirect taking is not an oxymoron. Nor, for that
matter, would compensation for a seizure of intangible property be a
strange reading of the words in the Takings Clause. A direct taking
by regulation, although it might not be “physical,” could easily fit into
the original definition of the word “taken.” The fact that direct,
physical takings come to mind most naturally does not lead logically
to the conclusion that other types of takings are not well within the
textual limits.43
B. Other Clauses in the Constitutional Text
The next step in the textual analysis is to determine if any other
clause in the Constitution provides guidance in understanding the
words of the Takings Clause. In his recently published book, Property
and Freedom, Professor Bernard Siegan reads the Takings Clause
together with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.44 Reading
the two together—“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation”—Professor Siegan
concludes that regulations that deprive individuals of their property
are permissible only if they fall under the Takings Clause.45
Under Siegan’s interpretation, the Due Process Clause applies to
both criminal and civil matters, but the Takings Clause only applies
to civil matters.46 The Due Process Clause’s text, therefore, is
absolute as to criminal matters, but for civil matters the text has a
Takings Clause exception for the power of eminent domain. Siegan,
following Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation, understands the law
to enable only the judiciary to deprive citizens of their rights, not the
legislature.47
According to Hamilton’s understanding of the Due Process Clause
of the New York Constitution:
[N]o man shall be disfranchised or deprived of any right, but by
due process of law, or the judgment of his peers. The words “due
process” have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to
43. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that although individual events may
have inspired constitutional provisions, their application is broader than the original
occurrence).
44. See BERNARD SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATIONS 27 (1997).
45. See id. at 27-28 (quoting and analyzing the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution).
46. See id. at 28.
47. See id. at 26 (discussing Hamilton’s speech made to the New York legislature
on February 6, 1787, in which he “insisted” that the power to deprive persons of
property lies solely with the judiciary).
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the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never
48
be referred to an act of legislature.

Hamilton reportedly declared that “I hold it to be a maxim which
ought to be sacred in our form of government, that no man ought to
be deprived of any right or privilege which he enjoys under the
Constitution, but for some offense proved in due course of law.”49
It follows under this theory that any government action that
deprives a person of property, other than legal proceedings against
the individual, would be prohibited by the Due Process Clause unless
it was an exercise of eminent domain. If we presume regulation of
vested property rights is permitted under the Due Process Clause,
Siegan’s thesis suggests that we must read the word “taken” to cover
non-physical takings. Otherwise, the regulation could not fit into the
Due Process exception.50
In contrast, Professor Jed Rubenfeld argues that the Due Process
Clause allows property to be taken so long as there are certain
protections for the individual whose property is taken.51 It follows
that takings that fall outside of the Takings Clause under this
espoused theory still are textually permissible so long as the process is
fair.
It is noteworthy that the government’s police power to regulate
does not always deprive one of property52 because one’s property
rights are preconditioned on the public health and safety.53 Many
48. New York Assembly, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, THE DAILY
ADVISOR, Feb. 8, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Harold
C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962).
49. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 238 (Patrick T. Conley & John P.
Kaminski eds., 1992).
50. See SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 27 (“Regulation requires deprivation of one or
more prerogatives of ownership, and even if it is not subject to the Takings Clause, it
would come under the prohibition of the due process clause.”).
51. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1119 (1993) (finding that a
plain reading of the Constitution reveals that because the Due Process Clause, which
provides protections when property is taken, precedes the Compensation Clause,
there is a “special provision for . . . cases in which private property is not merely
taken, but taken for public use”).
52. For an example of this idea in practice, see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
667-69 (1887), which held that regulation may not prevent an owner from
controlling, using, or disposing of property, but may only prevent an owner from
using the property for purposes against the public interest.
53. Professor Kmiec argues that the distinction between harm and benefit was
well accepted during the Founding Era, such that harmful uses of property would
not be protected under the original understanding of the Takings Clause. See
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor
Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1635 (1998) (discussing Madison’s adoption of
Blackstone’s “total exclusion” definition of property where there are no property
rights when someone’s property is harmed); see also SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 18
(suggesting that Blackstone did not support the protection of harmful uses of
property, and that “statutes and common law could regulate and penalize the
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colonial regulations of property use were justified in terms of the
public health, even where the purpose of the regulation seems to
have been only loosely connected to this justification.54 If the
Framers viewed due process as a mere guarantee of fairness, or if they
viewed property regulation as an extension of the police power
protection against nuisances, then the Due Process Clause would not
necessarily answer the regulatory taking question.55
The text, therefore, appears to allow for more than one legitimate
interpretation of the meaning of “taken.” The text could mean
“direct, physical taking,” or it could encompass both direct physical
and direct regulatory takings.56 Indirect, consequential takings are
almost never compensated today, and they pose problems of state
action under the broadest reading of the text. Such indirect,
consequential takings, however, are also a possibility. The question
of when property has been “taken,” therefore, requires consideration
of other historical evidence.
II. MADISON’S PRE-RATIFICATION COMMENTARY
A. Madison’s Proposal of the Bill of Rights
Many commentators consider James Madison’s views on the
Takings Clause to be the primary evidence of its meaning because he
authored the Takings Clause.57 Madison’s speech proposing the draft
Bill of Rights is arguably his most significant statement on the
Takings Clause because it is the only one that preceded ratification.58
maintenance of both public and private nuisances”).
54. See discussion infra Part VI.
55. The pattern of colonial regulations supports this argument. As discussed
above, however, other sources suggest that the prevailing legal philosophy limited
the police power to certain common law cases. See Kmiec, supra note 53, at 1633-35
(discussing the distinction between compensation for benefit and harm to property).
56. Theoretically, one could read indirect takings into the Takings Clause, but
indirect, consequential damages are not necessarily an aspect of the eminent domain
power and are not commonly understood to be a regulatory taking today. See infra
Part IV. In the nineteenth century, indirect, consequential damages were covered on
a proximate cause basis similar to tort law. See Kobach, supra note 38, at 1292 (“The
final common thread of the early cases was the proximity requirement. Government
actions that devalued property only very indirectly did not constitute compensable
takings.”).
57. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420 (noting that Madison’s draft was the basis
for the Takings Clause); Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 790 (concluding
that Madison’s draft “provide[s] unusually significant evidence” as to the meaning of
the Takings Clause).
58. See SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 24 (noting that Madison introduced his draft Bill
of Rights on June 8, 1789). Madison later published his essay, Property, after the Bill
of Rights’ ratification to expand further his views on property. See Treanor, Just
Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 712.
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In his speech, Madison declared:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense; nor
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor be
obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for
59
public use, without a just compensation.

The only notable difference between the Takings Clause as
proposed by Madison and its final version is the word “relinquish.”60
Several scholars consider the original proposal to be limited to direct,
physical takings.61
Professor William Michael Treanor’s recent article, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process,62 is one of
the most significant writings on the question of regulatory takings
and original intent. Treanor relies primarily on Madison’s postratification remarks as evidence that he did not intend that the
government compensate for regulatory takings.63 Moreover, Treanor
argues that the language originally proposed demonstrates Madison’s
support for “the view that the clause only mandated compensation
when property was physically taken from the owner.”64
Treanor assumes his conclusion, however. Even if the original
language indicated compensation only for physical takings, Madison
and the other Framers may have understood the amended language
as a change in meaning.65 Schwartz argues, however, that the change
in language was not intended to change the meaning of the Takings

59. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
60. See SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 21 (observing that the final version of the
Takings Clause allowed takings “for public use”).
61. See id. (“Over time, through judicial interpretation, the Takings Clause as
adopted would cover taking by overregulation, something that Madison’s original
‘relinquish’ language would not have allowed.”); see also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (“Since the text of the Clause can
be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations (in contrast to the
text originally proposed by Madison . . .), we decline to do so as well.”) (citations
omitted).
62. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2.
63. See id. at 837-40 (analyzing Madison’s post-ratification essay, Property, and also
letters written by Madison).
64. Id. at 837. In THE TAKINGS ISSUE, Fred Bosselman, David Callies, and John
Banta suggest that the change in language was probably Madison’s, although they do
not think the substance was changed. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 99
(“The language, but not the substance changed slightly in Committee, probably also
the work of Madison, and in Conference in the Senate, to its present form.”).
65. Compare Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1579, (Fed. Cir.
1993) (concluding that the change in the language of the Takings Clause resulted in
a change in meaning), with Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420 (observing that change in
wording is unlikely to change overall meaning).
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Clause because the new language had the same meaning as the old.66
On the other hand, Justice Scalia reads the new language as an
indication that the text may include regulatory takings,67 and the
Federal Circuit has interpreted the removal of the word “relinquish”
as an expansion of the Takings Clause to include regulatory takings.68
This last view is persuasive if one determines a change in language
was not merely stylistic, but was purposeful: if the new word suggests
a different meaning it is reasonable to assume that the alteration was
intended to have a consequence.69
Even if the words “relinquish” and “taken” possess the same
meaning, it is not at all obvious that the original reference to an
obligation to “relinquish” property is any more indicative of a
physical conception of property than the later Fifth Amendment
language of property that is “taken.”70 A property owner may
relinquish intangible property as easily as a physical piece of land. In
addition, if these intangible property rights are understood to be
“property,” certain government regulations would obligate the
property owner to relinquish property.71
Madison also included a preamble to his proposed Bill of Rights
that was not included in the final version. The preamble stated:
“Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit
of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with

66. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420. Schwartz writes that:
It is . . . most unlikely that the change in language was intended to change
the meaning of Madison’s draft Takings Clause. The substitution of “taken”
for Madison’s original “relinquish” did not mean that something less than
acquisition of property would bring the clause into play. Acquisition was,
indeed, the meaning of a “taking” with which the men of 1789 were familiar.
Id.
67. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992)
(observing that the text of the Takings Clause can be read to include both regulatory
and physical takings).
68. See Skip Kirchdorfer, 6 F.3d at 1579 (“Madison’s proposed language for the just
compensation clause changed during consideration in the First Congress. The
changes made the language clearly broader than Madison’s proposed version. The
Fifth Amendment embraces direct physical invasion as well as other types of
Government authorized intrusions.”).
69. It is entirely possible, however, that the change was a purely stylistic one.
This is the view taken by Bosselman. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 99.
Professor Schwartz notes that there is no legislative record of why the change from
“relinquish” to “taken” was made. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420.
70. Indeed, neither word provides a clear indication of a physical concept of
property because of an absence of supporting materials as to their respective
meanings at the time of ratification. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 420 (noting the
absence of a floor discussion and legislative history on the Takings Clause).
71. See SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 21 (concluding that the Takings Clause covers
takings by regulation, “something that Madison’s original ‘relinquish’ language
would not have allowed”).
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the right of acquiring and using property . . . .”72 This statement is of
limited use, insofar as the Framers never ratified the preamble, but it
does provide some indication as to which purposes Madison intended
to serve through the rights contained in his draft.73 The preamble
language suggests that Madison believed his proposed Bill of Rights
would function to protect the right of using property, and by
implication, this meant the Takings Clause would help to protect that
right where regulations were concerned.74
B. The Framers’ Views on Property Rights
Other extant pre-ratification commentary, such as the Convention
debates, fails to address the Takings Clause directly. Nevertheless,
there is significant documentation that suggests the majority of the
Framers thought the protection of property was a high priority. For
many of the Framers, protection of property was the most important,
or one of the most important purposes of the Constitution.75 For
example, Alexander Hamilton declared during the Constitutional
Convention that “[o]ne great obj[ect] of Gov[ernment] is personal
protection and the security of Property . . . .”76
It is important to note that the Framers disagreed on the exact
meaning of the word “property” as well as on how to protect those
property rights.77 For example, Jennifer Nedelsky has argued that the

72. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
73. See 5 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AN ILLUSTRATED
SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 1008 (1980) (observing that Congress
eliminated some provisions in Madison’s draft and states failed to ratify others).
74. The Due Process Clause also may have served to protect the right of using
property. This preamble nevertheless makes it less tenable to argue that Madison
intended legislatures to be able to regulate property without regard to
compensation.
75. See SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 15. Siegan argues that state representatives also
felt that protection of property was paramount:
Rufus King of Massachusetts and John Rutledge of South Carolina agreed
that the protection of property was the primary or principal object of society.
Pierce Butler of South Carolina contended that “property was the only just
measure of representation. This was the great object of government: the
great cause of war, the great means of carrying it on.” William R. Davie of
North Carolina, Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, and Charles Pinkney of South
Carolina thought the Senate should represent property or wealth. George
Mason of Virginia stated that an important objective in constituting a senate
was to secure the right of property. John Dickinson of Delaware considered
freeholders as the best guarantors of a free society.
Id.; see also F. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (1985) (noting property views of various delegates).
76. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION].
77. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 10 (explaining that the word property had
different meanings during the Constitutional Convention).
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Founders held a wide range of views regarding the importance of
protecting property.78 Nedelsky has explained that: (1) Gouverneur
Morris gave property the highest priority,79 (2) James Madison
attempted to protect property against redistributive legislation,80 and
(3) James Wilson gave a limited import to property rights.81
The Federalist Papers argue for the protection of property rights.
In Federalist 70, Hamilton argues that energy in the executive is
essential “to the protection of property against those irregular and
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice . . . .”82 Madison, in Federalist 54, argues that
“government is instituted no less for the protection of the property,
than of the persons of individuals.”83
More obliquely, in Federalist 10, Madison notes:
The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first
object of Government. From the protection of different and
unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different
degrees and kinds of property immediately results: and from the
78. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 (1990) (noting the diverging views of Wilson, Madison, and
Morris).
79. See id. at 68-75. Some of Morris’ more strongly worded comments included
the following: “Above all things government should never forget that . . . if the rights
of property are invaded, order and justice will at once take their flight and perhaps
forever.” Id. at 73 (citations omitted). In an attack on depreciating currency, Morris
declared, “Those who had been compelled to accept the paper would be as
effectively robbed by the two acts of government taken together as they would have
been by the one act of a highway man or house breaker.” See id. It seems likely,
based on Morris’ unyielding rhetoric about the role of property rights in a just
society, that he would prefer a Takings Clause that compensated regulatory takings,
although this preference does not tell us what the textual language meant.
80. Nedelsky states:
Madison did not . . . have a simple conception of property as land or even
material goods. The “faculties of acquiring property” emphasized a subtle,
nonmaterial dimension of property. And the legislative injustice he feared
was not straightforward confiscation, but the more indirect infringements
inherent in paper money and debtor relief law.
Id. at 30.
Nedelsky argues that Madison opposed laws with redistributive
consequences. See id. “But we know that he did not envision a government that
simply took a hands-off attitude toward property.” Id.
81. Nedelsky asserts:
The importance of Wilson’s concept of man as a social creature is not that it
replaces a concern with man’s individual rights and interests, but that it
denies that this is all there is to man . . . . The relative unimportance of
property in Wilson’s theory should be understood in this context of Wilson’s
nonindividualistic, nonlibertarian premises and priorities.
Id. at 101.
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 370 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective
proprietors ensues a division of society into different interests and
parties.84

In his effort to determine the causes of faction, which he argues
cannot be removed, Madison explains “the most common and
durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without
property, have ever formed distinct interests in society.”85
Although the subject of Madison’s essay in the Federalist 10 is the
source of factions and how to prevent their effects, his claim—that
the protection of the faculties that produce different types of
property is the object of government—necessarily places great
importance on protection for the different types of property. Two of
Madison’s remarks may indicate a non-physical conception of
property. First, Madison speaks of the “rights of property,” not the
“right to property.” Second, Madison speaks of different “degrees
and kinds of property.” This last remark may merely refer to the
different types and amounts of property owned by the landed class,
the merchant class, and any other faction. The reference to the
“rights of property,” however, suggests Madison desired protection
for the various rights that are a necessary part of the ownership of
property.86
Nedelsky concludes that Madison believed that “[t]ax policies and
economic regulation might have some redistributive consequences,
but it should not be their objective to benefit some at the expense of
others.”87 In light of Federalist 10, Treanor interprets the Madisonian
perspective on economic regulation to mean that Madison “did not
want a compensation requirement that would extend to any
government action that would affect the value of property.”88
Treanor argues that Madison’s perspective on property explains why
Madison would have proposed a Takings Clause limited to direct,
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
85. Id. at 59.
86. Underkuffler writes that:
In the Federalist No. 10, the ostensible meaning of property is that which we
ordinarily understand: Madison lists creditors, debtors, landed interests,
manufacturing interests, mercantile interests, and monied interests as
interests which must be regulated by government. However, it is possible to
see something else in the discussion. Madison’s emphasis upon liberty both
as a cause of faction and as something which entitles property to protection
from government suggests that he was concerned with more than protection
of rights in material objects.
Underkuffler, supra note 39, at 134-35.
87. NEDELSKY, supra note 78, at 31.
88. Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 844.
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physical takings.89 It is unclear, however, why Madison’s acceptance
of economic regulation would not preclude mere compensation for
regulation of transactions,90 as opposed to regulation of rights of use
with respect to real property.
Federalist 10 also includes language suggesting that certain forms
of intrusions on property rights are unlikely to occur at a local level:
[A] rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,
will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a
particular member of it, in the same proportion as such a malady is
more likely to taint a particular county or district than an entire
state.91

Treanor argues that Madison’s view on the local nature of factions
meant that he believed the federal government protected property
rights and implies that “there is no need for special heightened
protection of property interests against the federal government
because there are already adequate structural protections for those
interests.”92
The difficulty with this theory is that it ignores the fact that the
Takings Clause, as originally intended, applied only to the federal
government and not the states.93 A common belief is that Madison
would have preferred to extend the Takings Clause to protect
individual property rights from the state governments as well. The

89. See id. (“[Madison] believed that government, in pursuit of the
commonweal[th], necessarily employed tax policies and regulations that
consequentially hurt some economic interests.”). In fact, Treanor suggests that
Madison may have favored redistributive regulations, and therefore opposed a
compensation requirement for regulations. See id. This is, however, an admitted
change in perspective from his apparent earlier view that Madison’s motivation was
purely liberal. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 709-10
(“Madison was a liberal. The ideas of a readily discernible common interest and of
property rights subject to government abridgment were alien to him.”).
90. In fact, the Supreme Court, even while recognizing regulatory takings, has
refused to grant compensation for a regulation of the right of alienation. See Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1979) (denying compensation where statute prohibited
sale of eagle feathers). The regulation of transactions more properly falls under the
Contract Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause, if at the state level, rather than the
Takings Clause. See generally Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract
Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526
(1987) (arguing that the correct interpretation of the Contract Clause “prohibits all
retrospective, redistributive legislation” which violated inherent contract rights);
Laura Ricciardi & Michael B. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legislation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV.
301, 302-12 (1997) (arguing that the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto
Clause covers civil legislation). Economic regulation was an exception to property
rights under common colonial conceptions. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 14.
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
92. Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 843.
93. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 708.
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Takings Clause, however, was not adopted in this manner.94
The likely inability to pass a state-level takings clause may have
several ramifications. First, if the Takings Clause deviated sufficiently
from state practice such that it would not be ratified if applied to the
states, its presumed effect on state regulation would be significant.95
Treanor claims that the norm in colonial times was to compensate
only for physical appropriations.96 By implication, the Takings Clause
could have permitted compensation in different circumstances than
those to which the colonies were accustomed, such as for regulatory
takings.
Second, even if the greater ambit of the Takings Clause did not
include many regulatory takings, its novelty must have been
sufficiently important to preclude reliance solely on colonial practices
and just compensation statutes as models for the definitive
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.97 Inability to
ratify the Takings Clause implies at minimum a change from the
status quo, rendering it speculation to suggest what that change was.
Further, Madison allegedly intended to use the Takings Clause for
an educative purpose.98 This indicates that he thought the Takings
Clause covered forms of property not protected in the states.99 This

94. As Treanor states:
All of these arguments, of course, also suggest that Madison would have liked
the Takings Clause to have regulated state, as well as federal, actions. As a
practical matter, however, Madison could not achieve this end directly. The
movement to secure a Bill of Rights came from Anti-federalists who wanted
to limit the national government’s power. Madison’s proposal to include in
the Bill of Rights an amendment preventing the states from infringing
freedom of the press and freedom of conscience and from denying jury duty
was defeated by the Senate. . . . Presumably, an attempt to make a takings
requirement—a fairly novel right—binding against the states would have met
with a similar fate.
Id. at 843 n.308 (citations omitted).
95. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 843 n.308.
96. See id. at 788 n.28 (“[C]ompensation was the usual practice; the fact that it
was the norm, rather than the inviolable rule, demonstrates that the principle that
the state necessarily owed compensation when it took physical property had not been
established.”).
97. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 715.
98. See id. at 710. Treanor states:
Madison believed that his Bill of Rights would provide a standard for judicial
review of the actions of the federal government. Perhaps more important, it
would have an educative function. “[P]aper barriers,” he declared, have a
tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public
opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community.
Id. (citing Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), in 12 J. MADISON, THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 204-05 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds., 1979)).
99. See NEDELSKY, supra note 78, at 30 (arguing that Madison did not conceive of
property solely as material goods); Underkuffler, supra note 39, at 135 (proposing
that Madison intended to protect more than material possessions).
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Article suggests, contrary to Treanor, that the educative function of
the Takings Clause, if there was one, was not hortatory. That is,
Madison did not want the states to protect property rights not
covered by the Takings Clause, but rather, he wanted states to protect
property rights covered by the Takings Clause at the federal level.
Those property rights, it will be shown, included intangible rights,
appurtenant to physical property.
III. MADISON’S POST-RATIFICATION CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHER
EARLY COMMENTARY
Madison’s post-ratification commentary demonstrates a strong
interest in protecting the rights attached to property as well as to the
physical property itself.100 It remains unclear, however, whether
Madison hoped to protect property rights through the educational
function of the Constitution’s “paper barrier,”101 or whether he
believed the Constitution’s text itself served to protect those rights.
Treanor concludes that Madison’s post-ratification statements
“uniformly indicate that the clause only mandated compensation
when the government physically took property.”102
Actually,
Madison’s post-ratification remarks appear to lean towards
compensation for regulatory takings as well. In light of the scholarly
disagreement about their meaning, one cannot conclusively argue
that Madison opposed compensation for regulatory takings. The
post-ratification remarks of Madison certainly do not provide the
strong support Treanor describes.103
A. Madison’s “Property” Essay
The linchpin of Treanor’s reasoning is Madison’s essay, Property,
published in the 1792 National Gazette.104 This essay was a response
to Hamilton’s economic proposals, and Treanor argues it should be
read in that context.105 Hamilton, just prior to Madison’s Property
100. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 712.
101. See id.
102. Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 791.
103. Compare NEDELSKY, supra note 78, at 30 (emphasizing Madison’s
“nonmaterial” definition of property), and Underkuffler, supra note 39, at 134-35
(describing Madison’s broad understanding of property), with Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 2, at 711 n.97 (suggesting that St. George Tucker’s 1803 treatise
supports his view that the Takings Clause was concerned mostly with physical
seizures).
104. See James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 J. MADISON,
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-67 (R. Rutland & T. Mason eds., 1983)
[hereinafter Property].
105. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 838 (“Property was one of the
series of essays that Madison published in the National Gazette newspaper in
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essay, had published his Report on the Subject of Manufactures in
support of certain tariffs and bounties to encourage manufacturing.106
Madison opposed Hamilton’s view, and in his essay declared:
[T]hat is not a just government, nor is property secure under it,
where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to
part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the
general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring property
strictly so called.107

Madison then proceeded to attack “unequal taxes.”108 Treanor
argues that the following paragraph proves Madison believed the
Takings Clause did not cover regulatory takings. Madison explained:
If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining
the inviolability of property; which provides that none shall be
taken directly even for public use without indemnification to the
owner, and yet directly violates the property which individuals have
in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties;
nay more, which indirectly violates their property, in their actual
possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and
in the hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their
fatigues and soothe their cares, the influence will have been
anticipated, that such a government is not a pattern for the United
109
States.

Unquestionably, Madison referred to the Takings Clause in his first
sentence. The conclusions one may draw from this fact, however, are
less clear. Treanor argues that Madison distinguished the indirect
violations from the direct violations covered by the Takings Clause.110
Thus, regulatory takings, as indirect violations, would not be
compensable under the Fifth Amendment.111
The flaw in Treanor’s reasoning is that it does not interpret
response to Hamilton’s economic program, and the essay should be understood
against that background.”).
106. See generally S. ELKINS & E. MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 258-64 (1992)
(summarizing Hamilton’s industrial vision).
107. Property, supra note 104, at 267.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Treanor writes:
[C]ompensation is not mandated for “indirect[] violations” of property.
The contrast suggests that compensation is mandated for physical takings—
“direct[]” violations—not regulations—“indirect[]” violations. To put this
phrase in context: Madison is arguing that Hamilton’s program is not
barred by the rule of law established by the Takings Clause, but that it is
inconsistent with the principle for which the clause stands.
Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 838-39.
111. See id.
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Madison’s remarks in context.112 The indirect violations of property
addressed by the Property essay were presumably the taxes and tariffs
proposed by Hamilton. These taxes and tariffs interfered with
property by rendering it less “secure” and making it more difficult to
“acquir[e] property strictly so called.”113 Such government actions
“indirectly” violate the property in one’s possessions by limiting
transactions related to the property. A regulation that destroyed a
property’s value by forbidding any development of the property
could fall into an entirely different category:
a category of
regulations that, according to Madison, would directly violate property
rights.
Furthermore, if one shares Treanor’s belief that the first half of
Madison’s concluding paragraph addressed legally prohibited
violations of property rights—direct violations—and the second half
of Madison’s concluding paragraph addressed moral violations—
constitutionally permissible, indirect violations—a regulatory taking
could still be a direct violation.114 One must assume a purely physical
understanding of property to believe otherwise.
The indirect property violation is arguably just a surcharge on the
rights of contract, not the property subject to the contract. A tax on
sales, for example, does not limit the use of the property sold.
Although Blackstone termed contract rights “property in action,”115
they are not the property to which Madison refers. Moreover,
according to Professor McDonald, ownership rights did not include
the absolute right to buy and sell property in eighteenth-century
England or America.116 Indirect regulation under this understanding
interferes with transactions concerning property rights.117 Direct
property violation interferes with the property rights that inhere in
the property itself.118
In the alternative, Professor John W. Ely, Jr. interprets “indirect”
violation of property to include non-physical takings of property,119
112. See Property, supra note 104, at 266-67 (arguing that man has property rights in
entities other than physical property, including his opinions and faculties, and that
government should protect all property rights).
113. Property, supra note 104, at 267.
114. See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531,
533-34, 544 (1995) (concluding that a regulatory taking may be a direct violation).
115. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440.
116. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 14.
117. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 102 (arguing that some government regulation
restricts an owner’s ability to dispose of private property).
118. See id. at 101 (noting that direct regulations, such as land-use regulation, limit
an individual’s ability to use property).
119. See J. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 56 (1992) (concluding
that Madison had broad views of the Takings Clause).
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but he draws a very different conclusion from Treanor: “Because the
value of property can be diminished by governmental action short of
actual seizure, Madison’s reference to indirect infringement indicates
a generous understanding of the Takings Clause to encompass more
than just the physical takings of property.”120 Inasmuch as Madison
states that such indirect violations are “not a pattern for the United
States,” these violations may be seen as unconstitutional.121
Madison’s phrasing in his essay, Property, buttresses this argument.
Assuming that indirect violations of property do include indirect
takings, the tone of Madison’s language appears to place the import
of indirect appropriations of physical property beyond even the
violation of the property in one’s opinions, religion, or person.122 A
number of Framers held this property-oriented view.123
The
sentiment is reminiscent of Gouverneur Morris’ remarks during the
Constitutional Convention: “Life and liberty [are] generally said to
be of more value, than property. An accurate view of the matter
would nevertheless prove that property [is] the main object of
Society.”124
It is reasonable to interpret Madison’s comment to mean that an
indirect violation of the right to one’s possessions is unconstitutional,
as violations of the right to one’s opinions and religion would clearly
be unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and violation of
one’s person would be unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. Admittedly, this reading might prove too much, as it is
doubtful that Madison believed the Constitution prohibited
interference with “the hallowed remnant of time which ought to
relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares,”125 but Madison may have
sought merely to describe the loss caused by indirect infringement of
property rights.
Most striking is Madison’s view that property extended beyond
physical objects.126 It is nearly impossible to read the Property essay
and contend that Madison did not think intangible rights were a part
of “property.” In the essay Madison declared, “[A]s a man is said to
120. Id.
121. See Property, supra note 104, at 268.
122. Madison begins his statement of opposition to indirect property violations
with the words, “nay more.” See id. at 166.
123. See SIEGAN, supra note 44, at 15 (proposing that the Framers wished to restrict
governors’ ability to confiscate property); see also MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 3-4
(outlining property views of Gouverneur Morris, Rufus King, and John Rutledge).
124. FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 76, at 533.
125. Property, supra note 104, at 267-68.
126. See NEDELSKY, supra note 78, at 30 (noting Madison’s “nonmaterial dimension
of property”).
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have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property
in his rights.”127 Therefore, Treanor’s reading appears unnatural, at
best. Given that Madison referred to the Takings Clause in his essay
and explicitly stated that rights were property, it is strange to
conclude that he thought tangible property was protected, but
intangible property was not.128
Whether one equates regulatory takings with Madison’s “direct
violations,” or concludes that Madison’s “indirect violations” may
trigger the Takings Clause, Madison’s strong desire to protect private
property makes both interpretations plausible.129 Madison’s essay may
accommodate Treanor’s interpretation, but it is hard to comprehend
why Madison would argue for a non-physical conception of property
in an essay supposedly limiting just compensation to physical takings.
A more logical reading, assuming arguendo that Treanor is correct in
his assertion that indirect violations are not compensable, is that
Madison simply disapproved of Hamilton’s taxation program and did
not address regulatory takings under the indirect violations rubric.
B. Madison’s Belief that Emancipation Required Compensation for
Slaveowners
Treanor also contends that a Madisonian discussion of the Takings
Clause with respect to slavery reflects the idea of compensation for
physical takings.130 In an 1819 letter to Robert J. Evans, an opponent
of slavery,131 Madison states the commonly held belief that the
127. See Property, supra note 104, at 266; Underkuffler, supra note 39; see also
Donald Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an InterestGroup Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 56 (1998) (explaining the role of
Madison’s broad view of property in protecting liberty).
128. See Clegg, supra note 114, at 540 n.35 (arguing that Treanor’s conclusion is
puzzling).
129. There is a distinction in application between the two theories. A regulation
may take property directly even when it is intangible property, as when a statute
proscribes the right of use. A regulation also may take intangible rights indirectly by
consequence, as when a regulation of one thing destroys a valuable property right in
something else. Professor Kobach discusses this distinction in some depth. See
Kobach, supra note 38, at 1227-29; see also supra note 3 (discussing both direct and
consequential takings). One way of looking at the problem is to determine whether
the effect on the property as such was intentional. The mere unintentional
destruction of value would not necessitate a taking even under this theory. For
example, if a government building relocated so that a store that profited by its
previous association with the government building lost all of its value there would be
no taking. Professor Kobach provides an example which might be compensable:
government action on an adjacent property which results in flooding of a property
owner’s farm. See Kobach, supra note 38, at 1227.
130. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 839 (“Thus, because the clause
mandated compensation when the government physically took property from the
owner, it required compensation for abolition.”).
131. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 839 (identifying Robert Evans as a
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abolition of slavery would require just compensation:
They [non-slaves-owners] are too just to wish that a partial sacrifice
should be made for the general good; and too well aware that
whatever may be the intrinsic character of that description of
property [slaves], it is one known to the constitution, and, as such
could not be constitutionally taken away without just
132
compensation.

In fact, this language does not address regulatory takings.
Madison’s language emphasizes deprivation of property, however.
This interpretation of the Takings Clause as applied to slavery
requires compensation for government acts that dispossess a party of
his property by rendering all private use of the property non-existent,
not merely acts that put that property to government use. Thus, a
statute abolishing slavery as a form of property would suffice to
trigger the Takings Clause.
It begs the question to assume that rights appurtenant to real
property were not “known to the constitution.” Madison’s logic
indicates that intangible forms of property suggested by the
Constitution itself, such as those now recognized as intellectual
property,133 would be subject to the Takings Clause because they are
“known to the constitution.” The rule may still be limited to direct
takings of a form of property, albeit intangible, and not the usage and
disposition rights that surround the property, however.134 The point
is that this question can only be resolved by defining “property.”
The means of effecting emancipation show the limits of a purely
direct, physical takings thesis. Prohibition of slavery is not inherently
a direct, physical act such as the building of a road through one’s
property or the destruction of a building. Freeing of slaves can be
accomplished by means akin to a regulatory taking. The government
“slavery opponent”).
132. Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1819), in THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 315 (Marvin
Meyers ed., 1981).
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
134. Treanor points out that Madison’s letter indicates “compensation is owed
even though slaves are freed, rather than impressed for government service.”
Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 839 n.292. Treanor’s viewpoint contrasts
with Professor Jed Rubenfeld’s contention that a compensable taking “‘can occur
only when some productive attribute or capacity of private property is exploited for
state-dictated service.’” Id. (quoting Rubenfeld, supra note 51, at 1114-15). For an
excellent discussion of the “public use” requirement, see Nathan Alexander Sales,
Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Requirements, 49 DUKE L.J.
339 (1999).
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did not free the slaves to put them to public use, rather, slaves were
no longer the possessions of their owners.135 Presumably, such a
regulation would revoke owners’ titles to their slaves. It is difficult,
however, to support a theory that Madison thought the government
could absolve itself of its compensatory debt by formally leaving title
with the slaveowners.136
C. St. George Tucker’s Edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries
A final important post-ratification commentary is St. George
Tucker’s 1803 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries,137 which
contains notes on the Constitution.138 Tucker stated that the Takings
Clause “was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and
oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public
uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practised during the
revolutionary war. . . .”139 Treanor argues that Tucker’s explanation is
“the best piece of evidence explaining why most people initially
favored the clause.”140
A possible source of Tucker’s reading of the original purposes
behind the Takings Clause was the case of Respublica v. Sparhawk.141
Sparhawk is one of the few recorded colonial-era cases that tested the
compensation principle.142 In Sparhawk, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, upholding a taking of provisions from Mr. Sparhawk during
the Revolutionary War pursuant to a statute of the Continental
Congress, stated:
135. See id.
136. This is the problem discussed in Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 80 U.S. 166, 177-78
(1871), which refused to narrowly define “takings” as seizing property solely for
public use. In Pumpelly, the issue was whether the flooding of private land caused by
the construction of a dam across a stream is a taking of private property. The Court
ruled that the flooding of Pumpelly’s land, which effectively impaired its usefulness,
was a taking within the meaning of the Constitution, regardless of whether the
construction of the dam was for the public good. See id. at 180-81. An act that
amounts to a direct, physical taking might reasonably be included in the original
intent even if other forms of regulatory takings were not so intended. See Schwartz,
supra note 2, at 421 (“Despite [the actual acquisition original intent] interpretation,
there are situations where the Takings Clause clearly applies even though no public
acquisition of the property has occurred.”) (citing Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181).
137. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Philadelphia, Birch & Small
1803).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 305-06.
140. Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 835.
141. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (1788) (denying compensation to an owner whose
property was taken for military use during the Revolutionary War).
142. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 88 (noting the lack of recorded cases
concerning land use during the colonial era).
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The transaction, it must be remembered, happened flagrante bello;
and many things are lawful in that season, which would not be
permitted in time of peace. The seizure of the property in
question, can, indeed, only be justified under this distinction; for,
143
otherwise, it would clearly have been a trespass.

Tucker describes the intent of the Takings Clause in a manner far
removed from the text. His interpretation does not resolve the
question of whether military impressment is the full meaning of a
“taking” of “property.” Although impressment clearly would always
be a “direct, physical taking,” the originalist solely is concerned with
the meanings of the words as they were understood when originally
written, not with connotations subsequently imposed on those
words.144 Tucker does not indicate what he thinks the words meant to
the Founders, but what harms the Founders may have hoped their
words would prevent. Even those who believe the Takings Clause
only covers direct physical takings are unlikely to believe that the
Takings Clause only applies during times of war.
IV. COLONIAL, STATE, AND TERRITORIAL PRECURSORS TO THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE
The early colonial documents based on the Magna Carta145 stand in
contrast to the few just compensation clauses contained in the preratification state constitutions. The primary concern of property
holders in the pre-Revolutionary War era was due process of law.
Many state constitutions reflected this concern. As demonstrated
below, the authors of the state (and territorial) constitutions that
provided for just compensation—Vermont, Massachusetts, and the
Northwest Territory—were deeply concerned that their legislatures
would show insufficient respect for property rights.
Many of the Founders disapproved of the behavior of the state
legislatures once the English reign had been cast aside. This
perspective supported the need for the early state just compensation
clauses mentioned above. Even though this distrust of legislatures
may not have represented the prevailing view throughout the states,
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, if it were modeled after any
143. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 362.
144. See BORK, supra note 23, at 144 (describing the text of the Constitution and its
meaning at the time it was drafted).
145. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 9 (Richard L. Perry
ed., 1959) [hereinafter SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES] (recognizing that the Magna
Carta “played an essential role in the history of American Constitutional
development”).
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state constitution, was written against the backdrop of these state just
compensation clauses. The pre-ratification history in Vermont,
Massachusetts, and the Northwest Territory suggests a frame of mind
that was quite receptive to compensation for regulatory takings.
A. The Magna Carta and Colonial Charters
The legal template for the English and colonial American
understanding of constitutional rights was the Magna Carta, and most
of the colonial charters loosely followed its provisions for protecting
property.
The text of the Magna Carta does not provide for just
compensation upon a taking of land. It does, however, preclude the
King from taking grain without payment.146 There is no just
compensation clause comparable to the Takings Clause in the Magna
Carta, but there is an item comparable to the Due Process Clause.
The Magna Carta originally declared in Article 39:
No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of
his freehold, or in any way molested; and we will not set forth
against him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of
147
his peers and by the law of the land.

At the time of colonization, the document provided the colonists
with an understanding that property rights are fundamental, in large
part due to the efforts of Sir Edward Coke.148
In the early colonial days, most colonies’ charters had no just
compensation clause, but many of the charters referred to the taking
of property, relying on text similar to Article 39 of the Magna Carta.149
146. See Magna Carta art. 28, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 8, 11 (1971) (providing that the King could not “take grain
or other chattels of any one without immediate payment therefore [sic] in
money. . . ”); see also CHAFEE, supra note 34, at 45 (directing the reader to article 28 of
the Magna Carta which states, “No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take grain
or other provisions . . . without immediately paying in money . . . .”).
147. Magna Carta, art. 29; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 56 (the
authors note that the original Magna Carta contained 63 articles, and that Article 39,
in the consolidated version is now known as Article 29).
148. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 77-80 (describing Sir Edward Coke’s
success in declaring the “fundamental” nature of English rights under the Magna
Carta, and noting “more importantly for American purposes, the ‘fundamental’
nature of the rights attributed to the Magna Carta was established in the minds of the
English citizens who were engaged in the colonization of the new world”); SIEGAN,
supra note 44, at 16 (“Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-44) was also a
major source for colonial lawyers. Throughout the eighteenth century, Coke was
one of the most frequently cited legal and political thinkers.”).
149. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 786-87 (citing as an example the
1683 New York Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges, which provided that “Noe
freeman shall . . . be disseized of his freehold . . . But by the Lawfull Judgment of his
peers and by the Law of this province.”); see also id. at 787 n.16 (listing other similar
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Property was protected from a taking without consent, but consent
included approval by the legislature. In effect, property could be
taken if the taking was according to the law of the land.
The Massachusetts and Carolina colonies used just compensation
language.150 The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 contained
the following clause:
No mans Cattle or goods of what kinde soever shall be pressed or
taken for any publique use or service, unlesse it be by warrant
grounded upon some act of the generall Court, nor without such
reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie rates of the Countrie do
afford. And if his Cattle or goods shall perish or suffer damage in
151
such service, the owner shall be suffitiently recompenced.

The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, drafted by John
Locke, also provided for just compensation.152 Although they were
never implemented, the Constitutions authorized the High Steward’s
Court to build and lay highways with the following caveat: “The
damage the owner of such lande (on or through which any such
public things shall be made) shall receive thereby shall be valued,
and satisfaction made by such ways as the grand council shall
appoint.”153
A greater concern of the early colonial documents was the
prevention of takings by the executive without approval by the
legislature, not uncompensated takings per se.154 Unlike the Fifth
charters). One colonial document, although it allows for consent by the legislature,
appears to recognize that the government may take property without appropriating
all of it. See The Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of
Rights art. 3 (1772), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 203 (“The supreme
power cannot Justly take from any man, any part of his property without his consent,
in person or by his Representative.”).
150. See Massachusetts Body of Liberties § 8 (1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra, note 145, at 149; Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina art. 44
(1669), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 115.
151. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 145, at 149. Professor Treanor suggests
that this provision was modeled after Article 28 of the Magna Carta. See Treanor,
Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 785 n.12.
152. See Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina art. 44 (1669), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 115.
153. Id., reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 115.
154. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 701. Treanor writes
that:
While republicans believed that a body of legislators would act wisely, they
brooded almost obsessively about the corruption that they believed great
individual power had produced in England. By emasculating the executive,
the framers of the first state constitutions sought to ensure that similar
abuses would not occur in this country. The first takings clauses—which
barred the executive from taking property—did not reflect a changing view
of property rights. Rather, they represented only one of many limitations
imposed on gubernatorial action.
Id. (citations omitted); see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 94 (“Intermediate
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Amendment Takings Clause, which limited the legislature, the
English view was that a statute that did not provide for compensation
constituted consent not to compensate the owner.155
B. The Vermont Constitution of 1777
Three state constitutions adopted shortly after the Declaration of
Independence contained eminent domain clauses, but these
constitutions were modeled after Article 39 of the Magna Carta.156
Vermont, Massachusetts, and the Northwest Territory Constitutions
addressed the issue of eminent domain with clauses that required just
compensation. These just compensation clauses arose out of a
distrust of legislatures.157 A common concern among many citizens of
these states was the legislative acquisition and regulation of property.
The Vermont Constitution of 1777 was the first state constitution to
contain a just compensation clause.158 In contrast to earlier due
process protections of property, the text of the Vermont Constitution
could also serve as a limitation on the legislature. Article II of the
Vermont Constitution stated, “[P]rivate property ought to be
subservient to public uses when necessity requires it; nevertheless,
whenever any particular man’s property is taken for the use of the
public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.”159
Although the 1777 version of the Constitution was never ratified, the
just compensation clause remained in the Vermont Constitution,
which was ratified in 1786.160
colonial documents of the revolutionary period continued to follow Coke’s pattern,
expressing concern only over takings by the executive without legislative approval.”).
155. See Arthur Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 596, 598 n.15 (1942) (“The English Parliament, by virtue of its omnipotence
and its freedom from any legal control, may wield any power of taking. Accordingly,
the omission of a provision directing the payment of full compensation in a
legislative act concerning expropriation has been construed as authorization to take
without compensation.”).
156. See MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XXI, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1688 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS]; N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XIII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2632; N.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2788.
157. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text (discussing Vermont citizens’
displeasure with the New York legislature).
158. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. II, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1858.
159. Id., reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 3737,
3740.
160. See VT. CONST. of 1786 ch. I, art. II, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 3752 (“[W]henever any particluar man’s property
is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in
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A likely justification for the Vermont takings clause was the historic
difficulty citizens of Vermont experienced in keeping their land.
Many of the original settlers of Vermont had been granted their land
from New Hampshire.161 When King George III gave Vermont to New
York, the New York governors refused to recognize the New
Hampshire settlers’ claims.162 Moreover, the New York legislature
supported later attempts by the New York governors to end Vermont
landowners’ claims.163 Consequently, Vermont settlers were not
pleased with the state legislature.164 This factual background may not
indicate that Vermont addressed regulatory takings in its just
compensation clause,165 but it does demonstrate that citizens of
Vermont would have desired limits on the power of state legislatures
over their property.
C. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
In 1780, the Massachusetts Constitution was ratified.166 It contained
the following language:
[B]ut no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be
taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent,
or that of the representative body of the people. In fine, the
people of this commonwealth are not controllable by any other
laws than those to which their constitutional representative body
have given their consent. And whenever the public exigencies
require that the property of any individual should be appropriated
to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation
167
therefor.

Unlike the Vermont Constitution, the Massachusetts Constitution
included a clause for consent by the legislature, reflecting the
tradition of the Magna Carta “law of the land” style clauses. On the
other hand, the clause appears to require compensation even when
money.”).
161. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 702 (“[Vermont] was
settled primarily by men who held grants from New Hampshire.”).
162. See id. (stipulating that “the New Hampshire grants were thereby rendered
void”) (citing INTRODUCTION TO VERMONT STATE PAPERS xvii (William Slade Jr. ed.,
1823)).
163. See id.
164. See id. (“A state legislature had attempted to deprive most of the citizens of
Vermont of their land. Vermonters wanted to ensure that they would never again
face such a threat.”).
165. There appears to be no pre-ratification cases interpreting this clause.
Professor Treanor was unable to find a single early case interpreting the Vermont
just compensation clause. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 791 n.50.
166. See MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. X, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1888.
167. Id., reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 1891.
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there is legislative consent. Many Massachusetts citizens considered
property regulation a serious issue.168 The Massachusetts Constitution
of 1778 was rejected, in part, because it did not sufficiently protect
property rights.169
In Lenox, Massachusetts, town meeting
participants criticized the framers of the Massachusetts Constitution
because they had not recognized adequately that “[a]ll Men were
born . . . having certain natural and inherent and unalienable Rights,
among which are the enjoying and defending Life and Liberty and
acquiring possessing and protecting Property of which Rights they
cannot be deprived but by injustice.”170 This statement, declaring that
it is an injustice to deprive people of their rights of acquisition,
possession, and protection of property, is a justification for providing
just compensation for regulatory takings. The alternative means to
prevent such “injustice” would be the absolute prohibition of
regulation of property.
Theophilus Parsons, who was a member of the 1788 Massachusetts
Convention, which ratified the U.S. Constitution, is an important
figure in this debate. Parsons largely authored the Essex Result, a
discussion of government that had a great impact in the Founding
Era171 and on the Massachusetts Constitution. In the Essex Result,
Parsons proposed that laws that affect property should require the
assent of people “who possess a major part of the property in the
state.”172 This view indicates more than a concern for the relation of
property and factions, as Madison discussed in Federalist 10.173
Parsons’ remarks indicate a concern among property owners that
regulation of their property would harm them. It is reasonable to
infer that the just compensation clause was one means by which
property owners sought to protect their property rights.
168. See INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL AUTHORITY 22 (Oscar Handlin & Mary
Handlin eds., 1966) (explaining that people of Massachusetts complained about
insufficient protection of their property rights).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 253-54; see also Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 706
n.68.
171. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 231 (1996) (“Written mainly by
Theophilus Parsons, the Result had a profound effect on the Framers’ thinking about
the separation of powers and individual rights. One historian of the period describes
the document as ‘an essay in political theory and constitutional practice comparable
to The Federalist in the sophistication of its argument (and in its political outlook).’”)
(quoting CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 29 (1922)).
172. Theophilus Parsons, Essex Result, reprinted in THEOPHILUS PARSONS JR., MEMOIR
OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS, app. I, at 372 (1859).
173. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(noting that the relationship between factions and property arises due to the
unequal distribution of the latter).
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Parsons also provides an analysis of the eminent domain clause that
directly supports compensation for regulatory takings. Using a
Lockean social compact model, Parsons explains in the Essex Result:
[I]n entering into political society, [man] surrendered this right of
controul over his person and property. . . . If the law affects the
property only, the consent of those who hold a majority of the
property is enough. If it affects, (as it will very frequently, if not
always,) both the person and property, the consent of a majority of
the members, and of those members also who hold a majority of
the property, is necessary. If the consent of the latter is not
obtained, their interest is taken from them against their consent,
and their boasted security of property is vanished. Those who
174
make the law, in this case give and grant what is not theirs.

This passage is striking for several reasons. First, it addresses laws
that “affect” property, and interprets a law that “affects” property
without consent to mean that a property interest is “taken.” In
addition, Parsons’ language addresses regulations of property and
uses “taken” in the same fashion proposed in the Fifth Amendment
textual discussion in this Article.
Moreover, Parsons, as Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, authored some of the earliest cases to support
compensation for indirect consequences of physical invasions of
land.175 From this evidence, it appears that Parsons, one of the most
influential framers of the Massachusetts Constitution, intended to
provide just compensation for regulatory takings.
D. The Northwest Ordinance
Adopted by Congress on July 13, 1787,176 the Northwest Ordinance
contained a contracts clause, a novel concept at the time,177 and a just
compensation clause.178
Without question, it provided more
174. Parsons, supra note 172, at 371 (emphasis added).
175. Chief Justice Parsons allowed for compensation in circumstances which were
not direct, but consequential harm to property. He suggested compensation should
be due when a government intrusion such as roadbuilding causes the property owner
to incur costs to use his land. See Kobach, supra note 38, at 1254-55 (discussing
potential expenses for building a watercourse compensable) (citing Perley v.
Chandler, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 454 (1810)); Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. (2
Tyng) 489 (1807) (finding expenses for building a fence compensable)).
176. See Northwest Ordinance, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
145, at 392. The impetus behind this Northwest Ordinance was to promote the
purchasing of land and encourage settlers to move out west. See id. at 388-89 (noting
that Congress recognized the revenue benefits of selling these lands to private
companies).
177. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 833 (“[The Northwest
Ordinance] contained the first contract clause.”).
178. See id. at 825 (noting that the just compensation clause broke with tradition
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protections for property rights than any early state constitution.179
The just compensation clause in the Northwest Ordinance
contained the following language: “[S]hould the public exigencies
make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any persons
property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation
shall be made for the same.”180 This clause, by reference to the
“common preservation,” supports Tucker’s interpretation that the
federal Takings Clause originally was intended to prevent
impressment by the military.181 Similar to the 1777 draft of the
Vermont Constitution, however, it would require compensation even
for legislative conduct.182 Also, the Northwest Ordinance contained
the unusual provision for compensation where services were
demanded.183
There are contemporary comments that suggest a broad, propertyprotective purpose to the Northwest Ordinance. Congressman
Richard Henry Lee of Virginia wrote to George Washington: “It
seemed necessary, for the security of property among uninformed,
and perhaps licentious people, as the greater part of those who go
there are, that a strong toned government should exist, and the
rights of property be clearly defined.”184 These remarks clearly cover
the contracts clause in the Northwest Ordinance, but may be relevant
to the Takings Clause as well.185
The Takings Clause may have been added to the Northwest
Ordinance, along with the contracts clause, by Manasseh Cutler.
Cutler, a lobbyist for the Ohio Company, apparently added the clause
by requiring compensation in certain circumstances).
179. See Northwest Ordinance, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
145, at 389 (explaining that the Northwest Ordinance included enumerated
individual rights, probably intended to attract settlers to its lands).
180. Northwest Ordinance, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 145,
at 395.
181. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 831 (“The language of the
Northwest Ordinance—and in particular the words ‘public exigencies’ and ‘common
preservation’—suggests that the clause was designed to require compensation when
goods were seized by the military.”); see also supra Part III.C and accompanying text
(discussing Tucker’s belief that the Takings Clause was originally intended to prevent
military impressment).
182. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 830 n.254 (noting that the
Vermont Constitution was likely to have been the model for compensation clauses).
183. See Northwest Ordinance, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
145, at 395 (providing that full compensation will be made to anyone from whom the
legislature “demand[s] his particular services . . . ”).
184. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington (July 15, 1787), in 2
THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 1779-1794, at 425 (James Curtis Ballagh ed.,
1914), reprinted in Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 832.
185. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 833 (“Clearly, Lee was referring
to the Contract Clause, and he may have been referring to the Takings Clause as
well.”).
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as a means of protecting the Ohio Company’s desired grant of 1.5
million acres in the Northwest Territories.186 Treanor views this
possibility as an example of the concern for process failure, which he
interprets the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to remedy.187 If
protection of a grant to the Ohio Company was the purpose of the
clause, however, the word “take” in the Northwest Ordinance easily
could extend to intangible property rights. A desire to protect
business interests from retroactive laws supports a regulatory takings
interpretation.188 Moreover, there is a strong originalist argument
that process-based protections of rights were not intended to
supplant judicial review.189
Assuming that the drafters of the Northwest Ordinance did not
perceive regulatory takings to cover takings of contract rights, they
included a contracts clause to protect property rights from every
conceivable government regulation. The alternative, that regulatory
takings were not covered but rights of contract were covered, would
leave an inexplicable gap in light of the drafters’ concern that the
“uninformed” occupants of the territories were a threat to property
rights.190 Whatever the intent of the Northwest Ordinance just
compensation clause, it is likely that it was intended to protect
property in the broadest manner possible.
186. See id. (“A strong argument has been presented to the effect that the
Reverend Manassah Cutler, A . . . lobbyist for the Ohio Company, was chiefly
responsible for it.”) (citing BENJAMIN WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (1938)).
187. See id. (“If this were the case, however, the clause would have been written to
remedy another kind of process failure: a legislature’s singling out an entity that was
disadvantaged in the political process . . . .”).
188. See Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 90, at 530. Kmiec and McGinnis argue
that:
The phrasing makes clear that this Clause [the Contract Clause] was
designed to prohibit the states of the Northwest Territory from interfering
with vested property and contract rights through the passage of retrospective
laws. This interpretation is confirmed by the placement of the Clause
directly after a clause that prohibited the taking of property or services
without compensation. Laws taking property are obviously retrospective
laws, because they abrogate rights possessed by property owners under prior
positive law.
Id.
189. See John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 197,
197-98 (1998) (“The Framers treated states’ rights in much the same way as they
treated individual rights. Although they believed that the national government
would restrain itself from violating individual rights, the Framers fully anticipated
that the courts would exercise judicial review to back up the political process.”)
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
190. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington (July 15, 1787), in
2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE, supra note 184, reprinted in Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 2, at 832-33.
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V. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES
ON THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF JUST COMPENSATION
One of the primary issues to resolve in understanding the
Founders’ thoughts is the role of republican versus liberal political
philosophies during the Founding Era.191 The importance of
individual rights was central to liberalism, but marginal to
republicanism. The republican theory, which was prominent during
the Revolution, emphasized the state’s active role as a cultivator of
virtue and traced its roots to the sixteenth-century humanists of
Florence, Italy.192 James Harrington is reputed to be one of the most
important republican influences on colonial American thought.193
Harrington’s 1656 Oceana was premised on a doctrine of balance,
whereby property was distributed equally among the king, nobility,
and people.194 Property ownership was desirable under this theory,
but only insofar as the individual owned enough property to
participate in the polity.
The republican view was overcome, in part, by liberalism during
the Founding Era.195 It is difficult to argue that the Takings Clause
was anything but a product of liberalism, unless it was a reflection of a
more narrow distrust of legislatures.196 Compensation for individual
property owners, if not an indication of distrust of government, is
centered on a concept of individual rights. Republican theory may
explain why just compensation clauses were not a part of the early
state constitutions, or why the Takings Clause was not proposed as a
limitation on the state governments, but it does not explain the
intended meaning of the Takings Clause. Recent studies of the
191. For discussions of these philosophies, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787
(1969).
192. See POCOCK, supra note 191, at 504-07 (asserting that American political
republicanism evolved from Renaissance political theories).
193. See David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of
Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 473 (1993) (“The
primary Republican influence upon colonial America is James Harrington and his
utopian treatise Oceana.”).
194. See id. at 473-74 (purporting to find support in J.G.A. POCOCK, THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 167, 405 (1977)).
195. See POCOCK, supra note 191, at 606-15; WOOD, supra note 191, at 523
(explaining the shift in political thought in response to the people’s perception of
their liberty).
196. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 107 n.220 (1999)
(suggesting that, in light of Locke’s use of legislative “consent,” “the proliferation of
just compensation clauses may have been due to a more general loss of faith in
legislatures”).
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Takings Clause agree that the Takings Clause was intended to
support judicial review of legislative actions.197 This policy cannot be
squared with the republican vision that the common good should
take priority over individual rights.198
Whatever differences in political philosophy the Founders may
have had, the important element for original intent purposes is
whether a particular philosophy was enshrined in the text of the
Takings Clause. The idea of compensating a taking is inherently
liberal because it implies that a government action, even with the best
intentions, must still recognize the right of the individual property
owner. This Article is concerned not with the desires of the different
factions among the Framers, but with their understanding of the law
when they ratified the Constitution. Any shared understanding of
property rights and just compensation, if one exists, is relevant to
defining the meaning of those terms in the Takings Clause.
A.

John Locke

Along with Coke and Blackstone, John Locke was one of the most
influential liberal thinkers on property rights during the late
eighteenth century in America.199 Locke gave property rights a role of
singular importance within the governmental system:
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property
without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being
the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society,
it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have
Property, without which they must be suppos’d to lose that by
entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered into
200
it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own.

Locke’s philosophy places property rights above the interests of the
government as long as the property owner has not consented to
relinquish his rights.201 In addition, Locke held a very broad concept
of property.202 Locke, however, argued for a concept of tacit consent:
197. See Kmiec, supra note 53, at 1647.
198. But see Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 276-78 (1991) (suggesting a combination of liberal
and republican principles on property was represented among Founding legal
thinkers).
199. See infra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of Locke’s
theories).
200. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 138, at 378 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1967) (1690).
201. See id.
202. See Underkuffler, supra note 39, at 138 (suggesting that Locke defined
property to include “the inherent liberties and rights of individuals”). Locke stated
that: “Though the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every
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“that every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part
of the Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit
Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that
Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it . . . .”203
Professor Richard Epstein gives content to the Takings Clause by
referring to the concepts of property and just compensation
espoused by John Locke204 and William Blackstone.205 Blackstone
defines property in the following manner:
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of
property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of
all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by
206
the laws of the land.

Epstein accordingly divides property into three rights: the rights of
possession, use, and disposition, which he argues the Founders
understood in their definition of property.207 The essence of
Epstein’s argument is that whenever the government takes any of
these rights without compensation, a taking subject to the Takings
Clause occurs.208 It follows that certain regulations that directly
interfere with one of these property rights would be compensable.209
Although Epstein’s views on takings have been challenged,210 the
import of Locke’s philosophy is clear.211 Professor McDonald notes
Man has a Property in his own Person.” 2 LOCKE, supra note 200, § 27, at 305.
203. 2 LOCKE, supra note 200, § 119, at 366.
204. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 13-16 (discussing Locke’s view on the role of
property in governanace, treatment of consent, and relation to just compensation).
205. See id. at 22-23 (elaborating on Blackstone’s definition of rights implicit in
ownership of property).
206. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
207. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 20-24 (discussing meanings of property); see also
id. at 29 (stating that the Founders shared Locke’s and Blackstone’s affection for
private property).
208. See id. at 35 (stating that prohibition against the taking of private property has
powerful roots in all legal systems); see also id. at 22 (discussing Blackstone’s
definition of property, which consists of use, enjoyment, and disposal of property);
id. at 23 (“Most important for this inquiry, Blackstone’s account of private property
explains what the term means in the eminent domain clause. A constitution that
wishes to protect private property must take the meaning of private property from
ordinary usage.”).
209. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 95 (“All regulations, all taxes, and all
modifications of liability rules are takings of private property prima facie
compensable by the State.”).
210. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 556-67 (1995) (questioning Epstein’s interpretations of
history). But see Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private Property
and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 591 (1995) (addressing issues
of “proper interpretation”).
211. For example, Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf note that:
Undoubtedly, one of the most influential thinkers for American statesmen of
[the eighteenth century] was the seventeenth-century English political
philosopher John Locke . . . . Whether or not a modern reader thinks that
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that during the Constitutional Convention “[t]he contract and
natural-rights theories of John Locke were repeatedly iterated
without reference to their source.”212
Treanor believes that Epstein’s interpretation of original intent is
dubious because Epstein’s theory “rests on his understanding of the
general principles animating the Takings Clause and the
Constitution, rather than on the specific construction that the
framers gave the clause.”213 But because the original understanding
of the Takings Clause is actually unclear, Epstein’s argument
legitimately suggests that the word “taken” may have extended to the
rights which inhere in property ownership. This reading is supported
by language from Grotius, as discussed below.214 Moreover, Epstein’s
argument does not require “translation” of the Founders’ concerns
into the modern perspectiveit simply interprets the Takings Clause
in accordance with the alleged Founders’ philosophy of property
rights.
B. The Civil Law Tradition
Treanor suggests that if scholarly writing influenced the rise of the
just compensation principle, civil law scholars, like Grotius and
Pufendorf, were probably the most important.215 Although Treanor
notes that some Federalists believed there was a natural right to just
compensation,216 he fails to consider whether the Takings Clause
should be interpreted to codify the entirety of that natural right as it
was then understood. The civil law tradition of natural rights may
extend just compensation to regulatory takings.
In light of the ambiguity in the original intent, Grotius’
understanding of the natural right to compensation is of added
significance. Grotius declared:
[T]hrough the agency of the king even a right gained by subjects
can be taken from them in two ways, either as a penalty, or by the
force of eminent domain. But in order that this may be done by
the power of eminent domain the first requisite is public
advantage; then, that compensation from the public funds be
Locke’s theory [of property] is a sensible one, something like it is necessary
to make sense of, and therefore give content to, the Takings Clause.
LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1991).
Professor Treanor lists several other articles in support of Locke’s role. See Treanor,
Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 817 n.186.
212. MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 7.
213. Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 815.
214. See H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLIE ET PACIS bk. VIII, ch.14, § 7 (1625).
215. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 815 n.178.
216. See id. at 835.
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made, if possible, to the one who has lost its right.

Notably, Grotius referred to compensation for the taking of
property in very broad terms, and did not merely refer to the taking
of physical property218—this perspective is in accord with Epstein’s
reading of Locke. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Grotius’
arguments influenced Chancellor Kent’s early nineteenth century
holding that compensation was due for the taking of rights associated
with physical property.219 On the other hand, Grotius appears to have
believed that economic regulation did not fall under the eminent
domain power.220
Pufendorf, in contrast to Grotius, does not refer to the taking of
property generally, but to the seizure of goods. In his discussion of
the right to compensation, Pufendorf stated:
The third right is that of Eminent Domain, consisting in this, when
urgent necessity of the state demands, any subject’s which the
immediate situation especially requires can be seized and applied
to public purposes, even if the property far exceeds the proportion
which he was bound to contribute to the expenses of that state. But
for this reason the excess ought to be refunded to that citizen from
the public treasury, or by contribution of the other citizens so far as
221
possible.

Grotius’ protection of property appears more extensive.222
Nevertheless, Grotius’ broad language shows that compensation for
taking of property rights was not necessarily a novel idea at the time
of the Founding Era.223 Indeed, the Founders easily could have used
language like Pufendorf’s, referring to the seizure of land, or of
goods, instead of the more general taking of property.
Treanor contends that these civil law scholars did not believe there
was a legal right to just compensation, but merely a moral right.224
This argument has no bearing on the Takings Clause itself, which
adopted the language of “just compensation” as a requirement.
Moreover, not all of the early eminent domain theorists considered
217. GROTIUS, supra note 214, bk. VIII, ch. 14, § 7.
218. See Kobach, supra note 38, at 1235.
219. See id. (commenting on the similarity between Chancellor Kent’s opinions
and Grotius and noting that Kent made explicit reference to Grotius’ writings).
220. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 54 (1964)
(“One of the little known facts of our legal history is that Grotius, the father of the
compensation clause, was a firm advocate of government regulation of prices.”).
221. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINES ET CIVIS, Vol. II, ch. 15, § 4 (James
Brown Scott ed., Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682).
222. See GROTIUS, supra note 214, bk. VIII, ch. 14, § 7.
223. See id. (stating that in the seventeenth century Grotius wrote that citizens
should receive compensation for takings of private property).
224. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 815 n.178.
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the right to compensation to be merely moral.225
At a minimum, the writings of influential legal philosophers at the
time the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was drafted suggest that a
broad interpretation of the takings that merit just compensation is
reasonable.226 Incorporation of the allegedly moral need for “just”
compensation into the codified legal right recognized by the Fifth
Amendment in no way suggests a limitation of the compensation
right to physical takings. Instead, it indicates that the courts now may
enforce the full extent of just compensation even where it would
otherwise have been a mere moral obligation of the state to do so.
C. William Blackstone’s Influence on the Understanding of the
Common Law
Among the most important additions to the takings debate is the
discussion of just compensation in William Blackstone’s
Commentaries.227 Blackstone was consulted as the decisive authority
during the debates at the Constitutional Convention to define the
meaning of legal terms.228 Madison quoted Blackstone in his Property
essay.229 Madison’s regard for, and familiarity with, Blackstone’s
understanding is especially important as a drafter of the Takings
Clause’s language.230
For this reason, Blackstone’s full text on the subject is needed.
225. Lenhoff writes that:
The theory of enforced sale originated in French writings on civil law and
was proclaimed by no less a writer than Montesquieu. It may have been that
Montesquieu, a conservative advocate of the protection of vested rights,
thought he could base the right to compensation on solid and traditional
ground by deliberately picking a concept out of the field of private law.
Under the older doctrines of natural law, compensation was considered as a
moral charge upon the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Lenhoff, supra note 155, at 601-02.
226. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 160 n.16
(1987) (listing other Founding Era legal philosophers who supported the need for
just compensation including Emer de Vattel, Cornelis van Bynkershoek, Jean Jacques
Burlamaqui, and Charles de Secondat Montesquieu).
227. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135.
228. See Schultz, supra note 193, at 484. Schultz writes that:
[Blackstone’s] views on the rights of Englishmen supposedly influenced the
writing of the Declaration of Independence where 16 of its signers were
known to have purchased the Commentaries. At the Constitutional
Convention the Founders discussed terms such as “ex post facto laws” and
“due process” in the sense that Blackstone had described these concepts.
Id.
229. See Property, supra note 104, at 266 (quoting Blackstone in claiming that
property “means that dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual”).
230. See id. at 272-73 (noting the importance of Madison’s understanding of
property rights in interpreting the Takings Clause).
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According to Blackstone:
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that
it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance,
were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might
perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits
no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of
the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual
ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous
to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the
judge of the common good, and to decide whether it be expedient
or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially
interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private
rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this, and similar cases
the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose,
and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose
and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property
in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification
and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now
considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an
exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an
exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and
231
which nothing but the legislature can perform.

There are several concepts contained in Blackstone’s argument
that
suggest
regulatory
takings
should
be
compensable.232 Blackstone’s example of a road through private
property is, in part, a restriction on the property owner’s use of his
land.233 Blackstone does not stipulate that title to the strip of land is
taken. Arguably, the state does not deprive the owner of his land, but
some of the land’s possible uses, through a required public right of
way. In fact, as discussed below, this view of road building as not
taking the land was the view of some colonies in New England.
231. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135. This understanding of the
role of property rights does not indicate, however, that Blackstone thought every
property right was absolute. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 13 (“Blackstone’s
sweeping definition of the right of property overstated the case; indeed, he devoted
the succeeding 518 pages of book 2 of his Commentaries, entitled ‘Of the Rights of
Things,’ to qualifying and specifying the exceptions to his definition.”). Professor
McDonald notes that Blackstone makes exceptions for rights reserved to the
sovereign when the property was granted to the individual, such as the regulation of
economic activity, and sumptuary laws, which regulated the public morals. See id. at
13-19.
232. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 786 n.15 (finding that
Blackstone argued compensation was due when real property was taken by the state).
233. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135 (referring to the “private
rights” of the individual whose land may have a new road built through it).
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Unlike the colonies, however, Blackstone appears to have thought
this loss of use was compensable.234 This interpretation is suggested
by Blackstone’s reference to the protection of “every individual’s
private rights,” and not merely private property.235 The “injury” was
compensable.
Furthermore, Blackstone believed the private rights that inhere in
property are protected.236 Blackstone offers this conclusion as
evidence of his introductory premise that the “regard for private
property” will not authorize “the least violation of it.”237 It is difficult
to read these sentences and not see parallels to Madison’s Property
essay, which suggested that even indirect violations “are not a pattern
for the United States.”238 The “least violation” of the “individual’s
private rights” is compensable under this reading.
VI. COLONIAL PRACTICE
Colonial and early state governments showed very limited respect
for property rights.239 Professor McDonald estimated in 1976 that
$100 million worth of property was taken without compensation
during the Revolutionary Period.240 During that time, Loyalist
property was taken, debts to British subjects were canceled, and
worthless bills of credit were issued.241 Although there is some
disagreement over the extent to which early statutory just
compensation clauses protected private property,242 it is clear that
regulatory takings were often left uncompensated by the colonies.243
It is certainly true that the colonies were familiar with regulation of

234. See id. (arguing that the state compels the individual to cede property “by
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained”).
235. See id.
236. See id. (“[T]he public good is in nothing more essentially interested, then in
the protection of every individual’s private rights . . . .”); supra notes 206-09 and
accompanying text.
237. Id.
238. See Property, supra note 104, at 267.
239. See id.
240. See PAUL, supra note 226, at 74 n.14 (indicating that Professor McDonald’s
estimate of $100 million is a conservative figure) (citations omitted).
241. See id. at 74.
242. Compare Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 788 n.28 (arguing
that the principle of just compensation had not been established based on the
absence of an inviolable rule of compensation), with James W. Ely, Jr., “That due
satisfaction may be made”: The Fifth Amendment and the Origins of the Compensation
Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4 (1992) (arguing that colonial and postRevolutionary practice supported a compensation requirement).
243. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 787-88 (listing
circumstances in which owners of private property were not compensated for their
land taken).
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land use.244 Frequently, colonial statutes that took property included
compensation clauses.245 Many statutes, however, did not contain
such clauses.246 In either case, there were numerous statutes that
allegedly regulated property for public benefit or to prevent a
community harm, thus formally avoiding the need to compensate.247
Therefore, it would be incorrect to assume that the Takings Clause
failed to mention regulatory takings because land use regulation was
unheard of in the Founding Era.
One type of regulation was intended to encourage development by
requiring property owners to seat or improve their land.248 An early
Massachusetts ordinance provided for forfeiture of title if the owner
did not build on or improve the land within three years.249 New
Netherland had an ordinance that required land owners to fence and
plant their land or else it would be given to others.250 Colonial
Virginia actually forfeited improved land if it was later deserted by its
owner.251 Other colonies passed similar ordinances.252
Regulation also covered enclosure of farm land,253 the rate of
mining operations,254 and drainage of meadows and marshes.255
Colonies even had regulations affecting the height and appearance of
buildings.256 One of the more egregious regulations was Maryland’s
Mill Act of 1669 (the “Mill Act”).257 The Mill Act empowered an
244. See generally Hart, supra note 2, at 1259-81 (describing colonial land use
regulations).
245. See Ely, supra note 242, at 5 (commenting that colonial statutes invariably
required compensation to owners when land was taken for public buildings).
246. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 787 (noting that all
colonies, except Massachusetts, took private property without compensation).
247. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1257 (commenting that colonial lawmakers
regulated land to secure public benefits as well as to prevent harm to health and
safety).
248. See id. at 1259-63 (describing colonial affirmative land use requirements that
reflect a policy preference for land developments).
249. See id. at 1260.
250. See id. at 1261.
251. See id. at 1262.
252. See id. at 1262-63 (describing North Carolina’s requirement of owners to
develop their land within six months of ownership and South Carolina’s
appropriation of non-used land).
253. See id. at 1263-65 (outlining colonial fencing regulations for farm land).
254. See id. at 1265-66 (discussing mining regulations in the colonies of Plymouth
and Connecticut).
255. See id. at 1268-72 (noting colonial legislation compelling owners to
participate in drainage projects in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).
256. See id. at 1275-76 (describing restrictions for orderliness and beauty in the city
of New Amsterdam, the city of New York, and in the colonies of Virginia and
Connecticut).
257. See generally John F. Hart, The Maryland Mill Act, 1669-1766: Economic Policy
and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private Property, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 15-18
(1995) (discussing the Maryland Mill Act as an example of a colonial legislature
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individual to get an 80-year lease on proprietary riparian land for
purposes of building a grist mill.258 The property owner could
prevent condemnation only by agreeing to build a grist mill
himself.259 The Mill Act did require compensation, but for less than
market value.260
Many of the regulations of land use were intended to prevent harm
to the public.261 Such regulations hardly qualify as evidence against
an understanding of regulatory takings, however, because noxious
uses were not considered a right of property.262 But some regulations
had purposes that were purely for public benefit, and often for
economic development.263
One cannot contend that these
regulations are other than evidence that some colonies had little
respect for the property rights associated with land use.
Nevertheless, colonial history does not prove that the Takings
Clause does not cover regulatory takings. It merely proves that many
colonists were familiar with such regulatory measures.264 It is worth
remembering that only two states had just compensation clauses in
their constitutions when the Bill of Rights was ratified.265
Early colonial charters, as discussed above, treated the law of the
land as a form of consent to the taking. As a result, just
compensation was never required as long as the taking was pursuant
to the law.266 But mere evidence of colonial statutes that regulated
vested property rights is not proof that these property rights are
unprotected by the Takings Clause. Regulatory statutes standing
alone provide no insight into the meaning of a just compensation

disrespecting property rights by a process of condemnation and transferal without
any judicial supervision).
258. See id. at 1.
259. See id. at 3.
260. See id. at 4.
261. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1273 (noting that several New England colonies
required landowners to destroy barberry bushes to prevent wheat blight and that
some also controlled when land was to be used for residences to maintain public
order).
262. See PAUL, supra note 226, at 72 (finding that property rights have always been
limited in that one could not use one’s property to the harm of one’s neighbor).
263. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1277-78 (describing New Netherland’s effort to
induce city building development and New York City’s order that undeveloped land
be sold).
264. See id. at 1281.
265. See PAUL, supra note 226, at 73 (citing Vermont and Massachusetts as the only
two states with constitutional provisions requiring the payment of compensation for
exercises of eminent domain).
266. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1283-84 (noting that just compensation was often
required by colonial regulation, although not by constitution or charter); see also
MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 268 (noting that prior to incorporation, states only
compensated for takings as provided by statute).
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clause not beholden to legislative discretion because colonial charters
would only require just compensation for regulatory takings where a
colonial statute required just compensation.
Furthermore, the difficulty in relying on the colonial practice to
prove that regulatory takings were intended to be noncompensable is
that one must make inappropriate assumptions about the ratification
debates. For example, Professor John Hart argues that the evidence
of the colonial practices refutes modern regulatory takings
jurisprudence:
The supposed American tradition of minimal land use regulation is
critical to reconciling the modern doctrine of regulatory takings
with the Takings Clause. Application of the Takings Clause to
regulations of land use must confront and explain the silence in
the constitutional text . . . . That silence does not present a fatal
objection to substantive review of land use regulations, however, if
the regulations under review are of a sort not found in America
267
when the Bill of Rights was adopted.

Hart concludes, in light of the numerous colonial aesthetic land
use regulations,268 that the textual silence is to be expected. “The
reason the Framers did not address land use regulation in the
Takings Clause is that they did not regard it as a taking.”269
In a footnote, however, Professor Hart concedes, “My discussion
assumes that current takings doctrine rests upon incorporation of the
Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment.”270 This assumption
defeats the entire historical argument.
As Professor Michael
McConnell has explained in depth, the Takings Clause originally was
intended to apply only to the federal government,271 just as the
Contracts Clause was intended to apply only to the states.272
Irrespective of one’s views on the appropriateness of incorporation of
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment,273 the scope of the
267. Hart, supra note 2, at 1289-90.
268. See id. at 1275-76.
269. Id. at 1292.
270. Id. at 1290 n.255.
271. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 268 (explaining that the Founders’ concerns
in protecting commerce and individual property rights led them to provide just
compensation only at the federal level).
272. See id. (explaining, on the same theory as provided for the Takings Clause,
that the Founders’ concerns led them to provide protection of contract obligations
only at the state level).
273. Compare Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 (1949) (finding a record of history overwhelmingly
against incorporation of the Bill of Rights), with William W. Crosskey, Charles
Fairman, “Legislative History” and the Constitutional Limitations of State Authority, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1954) (responding to Fairman and buttressing Justice Hugo Black’s
belief that the Privileges and Immunities Clause makes the Bill of Rights good
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Takings Clause in terms of regulatory acts must follow from the
intent of the Framers of the Fifth Amendment, who thought they
would limit only the federal government.274 Indeed, this fact may
account for the lack of debate on the Takings Clause in the state
ratifying conventions—the states did not stand to lose any power by
the Takings Clause.275
Assuming, as Treanor argues, that the Founders trusted the
legislature not to unjustly appropriate private property,276 this trust
was at the state level, not federal.277 Indeed, Madison showed a strong
distrust of legislatures generally.278
Equally destructive of the argument that the Founders intended a
against the states).
274. See Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 713 (“The Anti-federalist
apparently voiced no opposition to the just compensation clause. Since the
amendment was intended to bind only the federal government, these critics of the
Constitution had no reason to oppose the compensation requirement: Their fear
was that the federal government would be too strong, not too weak.”).
275. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1200 (1992). Professor Amar claims that:
Various state conventions endorsed amendments limiting the new central
government, some phrased in general language, others using words
explicitly targeted at the central government—“Congress,” the “United
States,” and so on. Yet no one ever suggested that the general language,
simply because of its juxtaposition with other clauses worded differently,
would limit state governments as well.
Id.
Professor Amar, however, also notes the opposing view that certain rights stated in
the Bill of Rights were merely declaratory of rights that existed under the state
governmental regime. See id. at 1206-08. This argument seems inapplicable to the
Takings Clause because its text clearly limits legislatures in a way that could not have
occurred under the typical early state and colonial due process protections of
property.
276. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 835 (“[T]he absence of
demand for a takings clause indicates that other national political actors had greater
faith than Madison that the national government would act in a way consistent with
property rights.”); see id. at 834 (“[T]he bulk of the evidence concerning the
predecessor clauses to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause suggests that these
clauses were not written out of a belief that legislatures could not be trusted to
protect property rights.”).
277. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 293 (“The Framers apparently saw no need
to retain the power at the level of government least likely to abuse it. The most that
can be said is that the just compensation clause applied to the level of government
most needful of restraint.”).
278. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 2 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Madison wrote:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With
equal, nay, with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges
and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts
of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning
the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of
citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and
parties to the causes which they determine?
Id.
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continuation of the just compensation scheme practiced by the
colonies is the fact that the colonies failed to provide just
compensation for many “direct, physical takings.” For example, in
New England in the seventeenth century, land owners were required
to allow town roads through their property, but retained title and the
right to build fences and gates across the roads.279 The legal
argument, based on the theory that such roads were merely public
rights of way, was that owners were not entitled to compensation
because the government did not take anything.280 Then, when a royal
decree required highways appropriated for postal service, the
colonies narrowed the roads but provided no compensation because
the taking was compensated by letting the landowner keep the rest of
his land.281
Thus, the evidence of colonial practices proves too much.
Although it is possible to argue that the Framers did not intend the
Takings Clause to be enforced because the colonists did not enforce
just compensation, this argument is not an acceptable originalist
position. Courts must assume that the Constitution was meant to be
enforced.
VII. POST-RATIFICATION CASE LAW
Early Takings Clause decisions in the Supreme Court suffer from
the same weakness as the pre-ratification commentary,282 as there is
almost no early Supreme Court case law applying the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.283 The early state court decisions, on
the other hand, show two lines of jurisprudence: one that provided
compensation for regulatory takings284 and one that precluded
compensation.285
279. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 22.
280. See id. at 23 (advancing the position of denying compensation in the absence
of a total taking).
281. See id. (recognizing the practice in which adjacent landowners were given
land obtained from narrowing of roads as compensation for land taken).
282. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting the lack of historical
commentary).
283. Professor Treanor offers a variety of reasons for why there is a lack of early
Supreme Court case law applying the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. See Treanor,
Takings Clause, supra note 2, at 794 n.69 (asserting that the lack of case law is due to
three principal factors: the Takings Clause was held to apply only against the federal
government, the federal government relied on states to condemn the property to be
taken, and Congress solely was responsible for paying takings claims against the
federal government).
284. See infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text (discussing cases that provided
compensation for regulatory takings).
285. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory takings
cases that found compensation unnecessary).
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Protection for nonphysical takings, contrary to some accounts, was
recognized very early in the nation’s history. In 1816, Chancellor
Kent decided a case in which government diversion of a stream had
diminished the amount of water flowing to the plaintiff’s property.286
In Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh,287 Kent held the right to
water “is as sacred as the right to the soil over which it flows,”288 and
concluded that it was “part of the freehold of which no man can be
disseized ‘but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by due process of
law.’”289 New York did not have a just compensation clause at the
time;290 Kent ruled on the basis of natural law, as many state judges
did in that era.291 The notable aspect of the Gardner holding for
purposes of this Article, however, is that Kent’s conception of the
taking of property was not limited to the physical land, but
encompassed rights that pertained to land ownership.292
Even earlier, in 1807, Chief Justice Parsons of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court had reached, in dicta, a similar conclusion to
Kent.293 In Commonwealth v. Coombs,294 a Massachusetts statute required
a Court of Sessions to determine compensation for damage when a
public highway was built through private land.295 One effect of such
highways was the need to build additional fencing to protect
livestock.296 Chief Justice Parsons barred construction of a road where
the compensation procedures were not followed, and added:
In estimating the damages, the committee are [sic] not confined to
286. See Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. ch. 162, 163
(N.Y. Ch. 1816) (explaining that trustees of the Village of Newburgh, acting pursuant
to an act of the legislature, attempted to divert a stream that would have resulted in
great harm to plaintiff’s farm).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 165-66.
289. Id. at 166 (arguing that this common right is fundamental and dates back to
the Magna Carta).
290. See J.A.C. Grant, The “Higher Law” Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
WIS. L. REV. 67, 71 (1931) (noting that New York had not adopted a Declaration of
Rights at the time Gardner was decided).
291. See id. at 71-81 (discussing the use of natural law by state court judges to
compensate for the lack of an express provision in the federal or state constitutions
that protected against the appropriation of property for other than public use or
without just compensation); see also Stoebuck, supra note 26, at 573 n.66 (listing cases
in which state constitutions did not expressly require compensation, but courts
required compensation based upon natural law principles).
292. See Gardner, 2 Johns. ch. at 164-66 (characterizing the government creation of
a private nuisance as a taking requiring just compensation).
293. See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of
Commonwealth v. Coombs).
294. 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 489 (1807).
295. See id. at 489-90 (indicating that under the statute of February 27, 1787, the
Court of Sessions must assess and pay damages to the adverse party before
establishing a highway).
296. See Kobach, supra note 38, at 1254.
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the value of the land covered by the road, and the expense of
fencing the ground. The owner may suffer much greater damage
by the road depriving him of water, or by otherwise rendering the
cultivation of his farm inconvenient and laborious; or it may
happen that the new highway may essentially benefit his farm, and
297
that he may suffer very little or no injury by the location.

In contrast, a New York court upheld a statute in 1826 that
mandated that a church, whose land was conveyed by the City of New
York for use as a cemetery, could no longer be used as a cemetery for
public health reasons.298 In 1831, a Massachusetts court held that the
Town of Boston could take a right of navigation when it covered a
creek for sanitary purposes.299 In addition, in 1846, Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that
a property owner could be prevented from moving stones on his
private beach without compensation to prevent erosion.300 Shaw
characterized the statute as “a just restraint of an injurious use of the
property, which the legislature has the authority to make.”301 Shaw
further explained this principle in Commonwealth v. Alger:302
But he is restrained, not because the public have occasion to make
use of the property, or to take any benefit or profit to themselves
from it,—but because it would be a noxious use, contrary to the
maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. It is not an appropriation
of the property to a public use, but the restraint of an injurious
private use by the owner; and it is therefore not within the
303
principle of property taken under the right of eminent domain.

Justice Shaw’s position in Alger merely applied the common law
rule against nuisances. Not all of these state cases were mere
applications of the nuisance doctrine; indeed some scholars regard
the above line of cases as convincing evidence that early state courts
did not recognize regulatory takings.304 Professor Stoebuck has
297. Coombs, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) at 492.
298. See Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of N.Y., 5 Cow. 538, 542 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826) (upholding the statute in question and rationalizing it by weighing the
property rights of the church against the potential danger posed to the public).
299. See Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 184, 194-95 (1831) (arguing that
police regulations which direct the use of private property to prevent public harm
are not void even though they may interfere with private rights without providing
compensation).
300. See Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 58-59 (1846)
(reasoning that such interference is not so severe as to render it a taking worthy of
compensation).
301. Id. at 59.
302. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851) (maintaining that property rights, like all
other rights, are subject to reasonable limitations necessary to preserve the common
good).
303. Id. at 86.
304. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 106-14 (arguing that courts were
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argued, and is cited by other authors, for the proposition that the
prevailing rule in state courts of the nineteenth century was “no
taking without a touching.”305
Professor Kris Kobach argues persuasively that regulatory takings
were compensated in the early nineteenth century.306 Chancellor
Kent’s holding in Gardner, one of the earliest state just compensation
cases, was the first in a long line of cases that recognized takings that
were neither direct nor physical.307
Some cases recognized direct regulatory takings. For example, in
People v. Platt,308 decided in 1819, New York’s Supreme Court of
Judicature ruled on two regulatory statutes that required riparian
property owners to alter their dams so that salmon could pass over
them. A property owner whose dam was built prior to the statutes
sued and the court ruled in his favor.309 Chief Justice Spencer
declared:
The power of regulating and controlling the use of the Saranac, so
as to subserve the public interests, would have been impliedly
reserved, had that river been navigable; but, not being so, the
legislature have no greater right to pass laws, directing how the
waters of that river shall be used, than they would have to regulate
the use of the most inconsiderable rivulet, or streams throughout
310
the state, which have been granted by and held from the state.

The Platt court held that compensation was due for the property
taken.311
Furthermore, there is an important distinction between the type of
takings in Gardner and Platt. Although both cases dealt with riparian
willing to uphold police power regulations even when they left landowners with no
feasible use of their land); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1057-58 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that indirect and
consequential injuries to property resulting from regulations were not considered
takings).
305. See Stoebuck, supra note 26, at 601 (describing early notions of what
constituted a taking); see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 106 (explaining the
position of the nineteenth-century courts that only actual physical appropriation or
divesting of title constituted a taking).
306. See Kobach, supra note 38, at 1223-65 (providing in-depth analysis of the early
nineteenth century development of just compensation for regulatory takings).
307. See supra notes 287-92 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of
Gardner); see also infra notes 308-15 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
recognized regulatory takings and provided compensation).
308. 17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). For a more complete discussion of the
import of this case, see Kobach, supra note 38, at 1236-40.
309. See Platt, 17 Johns. at 214 (holding that the statutes constituted a regulatory
taking due to the fact that the river was not navigable, which precluded the state
from regulating its use to protect the public interest).
310. Id.
311. See id. at 215 (stating that appropriating private property for public use is
allowable only when compensation is awarded to the owner of the property).
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rights, Gardner covered a consequential taking, where the
consequences of government action indirectly destroyed property
rights.312 Platt, however, involved a pure regulatory taking, where the
government had taken the property right of usage.313 Both styles of
takings, the one indirect and the other non-physical, were soon
recognized in other states.314
Another group of cases which compensated non-physical taking
claims has been recognized even by opponents of physical takings.
Treanor concedes in a footnote that “judges repeatedly concluded
that the revocation of a franchise gave rise to a compensable taking
on the theory that the revocation was a seizure of intangible
property.”315 This means there was an early understanding among
312. See Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. ch. 162, 164-65
(N.Y. Ch. 1816) (noting that the governmental diversion of a stream for public use
resulted in a loss of water flowing over the landowner’s property, thereby causing
injury to him).
313. See Platt, 17 Johns. at 195-96 (explaining that the government attempted to
deny a landowner the right to maintain a dam on the river that ran through his
property).
314. Professor Kobach cites many early nineteenth century state taking cases in
which courts granted compensation where regulations took intangible property
rights, or devalued property by indirectly limiting its use. See Kobach, supra note 38,
at 1234-59; see also Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165, 170 (1859) (requiring
compensation for regulation that took usage rights from landowners by requiring
them to allow others to graze cattle on their land); Transylvania Univ. v. Lexington,
42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 25, 27 (1842) (granting compensation for regulation that denied
convenient access to and from property); Fletcher v. Auburn & Syracuse R.R. Co., 25
Wend. 462, 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (ordering compensation for denial of right of
access between owners dwelling house and the street caused by a railroad company’s
construction of an embankment); Patterson v. City of Boston, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.)
159, 163-64 (1838) (approving compensation for lost right of use of store front);
Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 454, 456-58 (1810) (allowing compensation for
potential expenses in addition to necessary expenses where a road was built across
the plaintiff’s land thereby obstructing his watercourse).
315. Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 792 n.56 (asserting that a
franchise is property and is accorded the same protections as real property) (citing
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 533-34 (1848)); see also Dix, 47
U.S. (6 How.) at 543 (Woodbury, J., concurring) (maintaining that a franchise
cannot be distinguished from other property); Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 571 (1837) (McLean, J., concurring) (ordering
compensation for the destruction of the franchise formerly granted to the plaintiff);
id. at 638 (Story, J., dissenting) (asserting that a franchise is private property, and so
far as it is injured, it is the taking of private property worthy of reasonable
compensation); Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & New Haven R.R., 17 Conn. 40,
59-61 (1845) (declaring that a franchise is accorded the same protection as an estate
in land in that when a franchise is yielded for public use, compensation must be
paid); Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360,
393 (1839) (determining that a legislature can take a franchise under eminent
domain, but only upon payment of a full equivalent); Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19,
24 (1840) (indicating that a franchise is subject to the right of eminent domain, but
cannot be taken for public use without compensation); Piscataqua Bridge v. New
Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 66-67 (1834) (rejecting any distinction between a
franchise and other property, and embracing the taking of a franchise for adequate
compensation when the public interest requires); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
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many judges that regulations could take property rights and fall under
the Takings Clause, or under its state equivalent. Title to the
franchise was not necessarily acquired by the government act, unless
by consequence.
For example, in Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge,316 the
plaintiff had a state franchise to build a bridge across a portion of a
river. The court held that if the state granted the defendant a
franchise to build a bridge in the same portion of the river, then it
constituted a taking of the original franchise.317 This type of
reasoning required an early understanding of property that extended
beyond physical objects to the rights that surround those objects, e.g.,
the right to exclude other bridge proprietors from the area. Justice
Story was among the judges who believed that compensation for the
taking of a franchise was appropriate.318
Treanor looks to late nineteenth century Supreme Court cases,
such as the Legal Tender Cases,319 for parallels to his understanding of
the state court decisions as limiting compensation.320 Treanor’s
thesis, however, conflates consequential damages, which are indirect
and frequently were deemed non-compensable,321 with a direct
regulatory taking of the property rights that inhere in the owned
property.
The Legal Tender Cases,322 which comprised a controversial five-four
overruling of a previous Supreme Court decision,323 declared:
AMERICAN LAW 400 n.a (8th ed. 1854) (maintaining that when public exigencies
require, a franchise must yield to the right of eminent domain, but just
compensation is required; even if the damage is merely consequential or indirect).
316. 7 N.H. 35, 56 (1834).
317. See id. at 67 (“If, instead of a corporeal hereditament, the legislature have
[sic] granted an incorporeal hereditament of such a nature that it may afterward be
necessary that the property, or a part of it, be taken for public use, why is not that
subjected to the public servitude, and in the same manner?”); see also KENT, supra
note 315, at 400 n.9 (“Even if the damage is merely consequential or indirect, as by
the creation of a new and rival franchise . . . the same compensation is due. . . .”).
318. See Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 638 (Story, J., dissenting) (arguing that
where “the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefore:
and . . . [a] franchise is property”).
319. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551-52 (1871) (asserting that the Takings Clause only
applies to “direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the
exercise of lawful power,” and that it “has never been supposed to have any bearing
upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals”).
320. See Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 794-97 (analyzing early
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Takings Clause).
321. But see supra notes 286-92 and accompanying text (discussing Gardner which
found a compensable taking even though the governmental action only indirectly
destroyed property rights).
322. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
323. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 624-25 (1869) (holding that an act that
forced one to accept U.S. currency instead of more valuable gold or silver was an
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[The Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring to a
direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting
from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to
have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm
and loss to individuals. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war
may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed,
render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the
worth of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a
tariff could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an
324
embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?

When the Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Cases ruled that the
Legal Tender Act of 1862, which made all debts payable in paper
currency, was not a taking despite the devaluation of debts to be paid
in gold, it made clear that consequential damages were not
compensable under the Takings Clause.325 Consequential damages,
however, are not necessarily the core of regulatory takings. A
regulatory taking is a taking of property rights appurtenant to
property, or occasionally the property itself, without physically seizing
the property or its title. Diminution in value is different and is not
always properly attributed to the government, as the Legal Tender
Cases rightly note. Regulatory takings are not related to the
devaluation or destruction of property rights as an incidental effect of
regulation not directed toward the property.326
Consequential damages are indirect effects on property stemming
from government acts or regulations that are not directed at the
property itself.327 Although some early nineteenth century courts
compensated consequential damages to property, such practices had
fallen out of favor by the late nineteenth century. For example, in
Smith v. Corporation of Washington,328 decided in 1857, the Supreme
Court was faced with a takings claim based on the actions of the
Washington, D.C. government, which had lowered the level of a road
unconstitutional deprivation of property), overruled in part by Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
324. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 551-52.
325. See id. at 551.
326. Justice Scalia takes note of the potential ramifications of this distinction in
contemporary jurisprudence:
The equivalent of a law of general application that inhibits the practice of
religion . . . , is a law that destroys the value of land without being aimed at
land. Perhaps such a law—the generally applicable criminal prohibition on
the manufacturing of alcoholic beverages in Mugler comes to mind—cannot
constitute a compensable taking.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 n.14 (1992).
327. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 51-52 (noting courts’ characterization of
consequential damages as unintended incidents).
328. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 135 (1857).
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such that the entrance to a home was unusable.329 The Court held
that the resulting inconvenience was “damnum absque injuria.”330 The
government in Smith had neither physically invaded the plaintiff’s
property nor directly taken any property rights from the plaintiff.331
Neither Smith nor the Legal Tender Cases convincingly supports the
“direct, physical taking” thesis because they both involved indirect,
consequential damages to property values. As a result, the holdings
in those cases are readily distinguishable from many regulatory
takings: a regulatory taking may be a direct taking even when it is not
a physical taking of property.332 It is true that the benchmark
twentieth century regulatory takings case, Justice Holmes’ Mahon
decision, may have run against recently decided predecessors.333 It is
impossible, however, to argue that the mid-nineteenth century rule
against indirect takings equaled an understanding that regulatory
takings were beyond the scope of the Takings Clause.
In fact, the Supreme Court recognized a regulatory taking claim as
early as 1870. In Yates v. Milwaukee,334 a property owner had built a
wharf that extended into the Milwaukee River.335 Wisconsin had
passed an act that gave Milwaukee the power to regulate
“encroachments” into the Milwaukee River, and Milwaukee had
already established a dock line limiting the building of docks.336 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that riparian proprietors had the
right to build docks to the point where the river became navigable,
and required compensation where the dock line would render the
owner’s property valueless.337 Peter Yates had a dock that was
rendered valueless by the dock line and sued in federal district
court.338
329. See id. at 146.
330. See id. at 148.
331. See id. (noting that the defendant had committed no wrong, but had fulfilled
a public duty).
332. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 100-01 (listing examples of how the government
can restrict the use of property).
333. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (denying compensation
for a regulation which drastically reduced the value of the property owner’s property
because the act was not arbitrary or unjustly discriminatory); see also Kobach, supra
note 38, at 1212-13 (arguing that Mahon seemed new in light of the Hadacheck
decision, but regulatory takings were actually well-established doctrinally in the state
courts as early as the 1810s).
334. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870).
335. See id. at 498; see also Kobach, supra note 38, at 1267-72 (discussing Yates at
length and noting how the decision was the Supreme Court’s first recognition of
regulatory takings as compensable).
336. See Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 498.
337. See id. at 504 (observing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court asserted that title
extends to the center of the stream, subject to easement for navigation).
338. See id. at 499.
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Justice Miller, writing for the Court, determined that Yates
possessed property rights that included the power to build a wharf to
the edge of the navigable stream.339 Consequently, the Court
determined that the Milwaukee regulation constituted a taking:
This riparian right is property, and is valuable, and, though it must
be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot
be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired. It is a right of
which, when once vested, the owner can only be deprived in
accordance with established law, and if necessary that it be taken
340
for the public good, upon due compensation.

Justice Miller’s conclusions parallel some of the holdings in the
Court’s recent decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.341
In addition to requiring compensation for the valuable right
destroyed by the regulation, Justice Miller held that Milwaukee could
not simply declare the wharf a nuisance to avoid takings liability.342
The wharf would already have had to be a nuisance under common
law principles. Thus, regulatory takings clearly were recognized
during the nineteenth century.
Moreover, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,343 decided in 1871, indirect,
consequential damages were held to be compensable.344 The Green
Bay Company, pursuant to state statute, built a dam that flooded
Pumpelly’s property.345
The Supreme Court interpreted the
Wisconsin Constitution’s takings clause as equivalent to the federal
Takings Clause.346 The language of the Court bears a striking
resemblance to Justice Holmes’ reasoning in Mahon, that a regulation
which destroys property value may “go too far”:347
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing
a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been
adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual

339. See id. at 504.
340. Id.
341. 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (“We emphasize that to win its case South
Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature’s declaration that the uses Lucas
desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they
violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.”).
342. See Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 505 (noting that the power to declare a
structure a nuisance by showing it can be a nuisance would give the local authorities
too much control).
343. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
344. See id. at 181 (opining that effective destruction of property or impairment of
its usefulness is a taking).
345. See id. at 177.
346. See id. (observing that the Wisconsin statute’s language is almost identical to
that of the Takings Clause).
347. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (reasoning that
excessive regulation of property is a taking).
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as against the government, . . . it shall be held that if the
government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect,
subject it to total destruction without making any compensation,
because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for the
348
public use.

Treanor argues that “the government action in Pumpelly gave rise to
a compensation requirement because it was a de facto physical
taking.”349 The logic of Pumpelly, however, would also support
compensation for any de facto direct taking, including one of nonphysical property, as in Gardner. It does not require a physical
invasion for the government to utterly destroy the value of a property,
and thus all but take the title to the property by means of regulating
the owner’s rights of usage.350
The protection afforded by Pumpelly was short-lived. A later case,
Mugler v. Kansas,351 distinguished Pumpelly as an exercise of eminent
domain, rather than the state’s police powers.352 In Mugler, a beer
manufacturer challenged a Kansas statute mandating the closure of
places that manufactured liquor because they were nuisances.353
Justice Harlan declared:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control
or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any
one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
354
interests.

But Harlan’s reasoning is not an argument against regulatory
takings as such. It is an argument against takings when they stem
from the state’s police power in prevention of noxious uses. Thus, a
regulation that did disturb the lawful use and possession of one’s
property might be distinguishable from Mugler.
348. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-78.
349. Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 2, at 795-96 n.74.
350. See Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-78 (opining that it would be a
perversion of the Takings Clause for the government to avoid paying compensation
for any act short of absolute conversion).
351. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
352. See id. at 668 (observing that Mugler involved a question of police power,
while Pumpelly involved a question of eminent domain).
353. See id. at 624-25.
354. Id. at 668-69.
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The police power exception was not new, but stemmed from the
English common law.355 The distinction between taking of property
to prevent harm and taking of property for public benefit was
recognized in Blackstone’s Commentaries356 and in law dictionaries of
the Founding Era.357 James Madison’s Property essay takes specific
notice of the distinction.358 Mugler was decided in 1887, almost a
century from the Founding, and so its relevance to original intent
analysis is attenuated at best. Yet, its meaning still falls short of
rejecting regulatory takings. Arguably, the Mugler decision cannot be
squared with the Court’s earlier jurisprudence in Yates because the
Mugler Court allowed the legislature to define a nuisance after the
fact.359
All of the above-mentioned Supreme Court cases were decided
long after the actual Founding. Consequently, it is mere speculation
to attempt to determine what a truly early Supreme Court would have
thought of the early state just compensation decisions covering
regulatory takings. The early opinions, however, do imply a sympathy
for the protection of property rights, especially under natural law. In
1795, Justice William Patterson, a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, authored an opinion in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance360
that applied the Pennsylvania Constitutiona document without a
just compensation clause. According to Justice Patterson:
[T]he right of acquiring and possessing property and having it
protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of
man. . . . The preservation of property then is the primary object of
the social compact. . . . The legislature, therefore, had no authority
to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in
361
another, without a just compensation.

Notably, Justice Patterson’s opinion is concerned with the right of
property possession and “having it protected.”
The Supreme Court’s 1810 decision in Fletcher v. Peck362 also
suggests a view of individual property rights as needing protection
355. See Kmiec, supra note 53, at 1635.
356. See id. (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2).
357. See id. at 1635 n.34 (citing as an example, G. JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. London 1782)).
358. See id. at 1635 (quoting Madison’s definition of the right of property to
include “leav[ing] to everyone else the like advantage”).
359. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 671 (affirming the state’s power to declare any place
dealing in alcohol a public nuisance, and reasoning that the statute is prospective in
that it only declares such a place a nuisance if it is injurious to the community after
passage of the statute).
360. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
361. Id. at 310.
362. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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from legislatures. In Fletcher, Chief Justice Marshall struck down a
Georgia statute that retroactively voided state land grants.363 Marshall,
recognizing that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applied only
to the federal government, not to state governments, held that land
grants were actually a form of contract.364 As a result, the legislation
violated the constitutional prohibition against state interference with
contract obligations under the Contracts Clause.365 Marshall noted,
however, that the taking of property was likely prohibited in any
event:
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of
government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power;
and, if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the
property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be
seized without compensation. To the legislature all legislative
power is granted; but the question whether the act of transferring
the property of an individual to the public, be in the nature of the
366
legislative power is well worthy of serious reflection.

The opinions of the Court share a common conceptual grounding
with Chancellor Kent’s belief in compensation for property rights. In
Terret v. Taylor,367 the Court declared that the taking of a church’s
property by a Virginia statute would be “utterly inconsistent with a
great and fundamental principle of republican government, the right
of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property legally
acquired.” 368 An early Supreme Court held:
That government can scarcely be deemed to be free where the
rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a
legislative body without any restraint. . . . The people ought not to
be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and wellbeing without very strong and direct expressions of such an
369
intention.

Early Supreme Court cases contained very strong language in
defense of property rights based upon natural law arguments, not
express constitutional provisions. Madison’s remarks indicate that he
shared a similar philosophy, although he thought the right to

363. See id. at 138-39 (holding that the Georgia statute was ex post facto and thus
invalid).
364. See id. at 137 (holding that a grant implies a contract that a grantor may not
reassert a property right).
365. See id. at 138.
366. Id. at 135-36.
367. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
368. Id. at 50-51.
369. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829).
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property was created by the state.370
The early Supreme Court cases, and certainly the early state cases,
demonstrate a strongly held view that property rights were extremely
important. It was not the only view at the Founding—many state
governments had never enacted a just compensation clause,371 and
the clauses were not always equally enforced by the state courts. Yet
intangible property, and property rights generally, seem to have been
comprehended within the Takings Clause if it is read within this
strand of Founding thought.
CONCLUSION
The text of the Takings Clause is ambiguous because the original
understanding of the word “property” is uncertain. In all likelihood,
there was no consensus by the Founders as to what “property” meant.
If one accepts the meaning of “property” as understood by its author,
James Madison, the Takings Clause would apply to regulatory takings
in addition to physical takings. One must remember, however, that
the Constitution was ratified by the states.
Unfortunately, the historical record for the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause is limited. There is enough material for a party on
either side of the regulatory takings debate to muster an argument
for his or her position. But there is nothing remotely sufficient to
prove the Takings Clause originally was intended to cover only
“direct, physical takings.”
The strongest evidence that the Takings Clause is limited to direct,
physical takings is the fact that many colonies had a practice of
uncompensated regulation that directly took private property rights.
The import of this evidence is curtailed by the fact that the colonies
did not have takings clauses that regulated the legislature and thus,
no strictures on colonial regulation comparable to the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. Although it is reasonable to question
whether such a significant change in just compensation protection—
limiting the legislature and requiring compensation for regulatory
takings—could have been ratified absent any debate, this is easily
explained by the fact that the Takings Clause originally did not apply
to the states. Moreover, many states were no longer as trusting of the
370. See NEDELSKY, supra note 78, at 29-30 (“Possession was merely a social right,
but the thrust of Madison’s arguments was to invest it with the sanctity of the natural
right from which it derived.”).
371. See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795) (applying
Pennsylvania’s Constitution in a takings case, even though the constitution had no
just compensation clause).
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legislature as they had been during colonial times.
The strongest evidence that the Takings Clause originally was
intended to cover regulatory takings are the Framers’ strong leanings
in favor of protection for property rights, James Madison’s postratification statements, and the just compensation philosophy
contained in the writings of Blackstone, Locke, and Grotius.
Although Madison’s statements do not carry the same weight as preratification commentary, they should carry some weight because of
Madison’s role in drafting the Takings Clause and the fact that he
published the Property essay so shortly after ratification. Madison’s
view supports the jurisprudential position taken by Grotius and
Blackstone and clearly extends the Takings Clause to non-physical
takings.
Essentially, there is a split between the colonial protection of
property rights in practice and the Framers’ philosophy and
rhetoric.372 Moreover, neither colonial practice nor Founding Era
philosophy was entirely clear.373
In such circumstances, it is
appropriate to extend the protection of property as far as the text
reasonably allows: neither the police power nor the power of
eminent domain are enumerated in the Constitution. The best
argument against a broadly enforced Takings Clause is the likelihood
that the states would not have ratified a clause that would cover state
regulatory takings.374 But this is an argument against incorporation
under the Fourteenth Amendment, an issue resolved long ago.375
Absent that caution, there is no reason to read the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause narrowly if its text reasonably encompasses regulatory
takings any more than the First Amendment should be limited to
political speech when its text reasonably covers others forms of
expression. Even if regulatory takings were not extended to the
states—a limitation that might approach the original intent in terms
of federalism—the Fifth Amendment would still cover regulatory
takings by the federal government.

372. See Schultz, supra note 193, at 491 (discussing implications of a split between
Founding Era rhetoric and colonial practices for property rights). Schultz argues the
correct way to see the influence of the political philosophies during the Founding
Era is to observe the Jacksonians who matured under its influence. See id. at 494.
373. See MCDONALD, supra note 75, at 4 (noting that the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention had different understandings of words such as property
and liberty).
374. See Amar, supra note 28, at 1181-82 (writing that no state ratifying
conventions had offered any just compensation restriction).
375. See Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1897) (holding
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was incorporated against the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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The constitutional text is clear enough to require something
substantive—it is not so ambiguous so as to raise questions on
whether courts may interpret the Takings Clause at all.376
Accordingly, the judicial system is well within the original intent
framework in granting compensation for regulatory takings.
It is quite possible, but far from clear, that the original
understanding of the Takings Clause included regulatory takings.
Original intent may raise questions regarding the current incarnation
of regulatory takings law,377 but it hardly resolves the question of
whether regulatory takings deserve compensation generally. One
thing is clear: the direct, physical takings interpretation “goes too
far” with a sparse historical record.

376. During his nomination hearings, Judge Robert Bork posed the originalist
problem created by the vagueness of the Ninth Amendment:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know
something of what it means. For example if you have an amendment that
says “Congress shall make no” and then there is an ink blot and you cannot
read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do not think the court
can make up what might be under the ink blot if you cannot read it.
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong. 249 (1987) (statement of
Robert Bork). The uncertainty of the extent of the Takings Clause does not raise the
issue arguably raised by the Ninth Amendment, however, because we do “know
something of what it means.” The uncertainty of the Takings Clause is the extent to
which it should be enforced.
377. The evidence of the original intent, whatever it was with respect to regulatory
takings, does not speak anywhere of lost value as the indicator of the existence of the
taking. See Sax, supra note 220, at 54-56 (arguing the diminution of value theory
conflicts with the early natural law theorists’ understanding of just compensation). If
the original understanding does extend to regulatory takings, then a strict
enforcement of the text would require compensation for destruction of even the
smallest vested right of usage if the right did not constitute a nuisance. This is,
however, an issue that is appropriate for another article.

